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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
In these related actions, appellee and plaintiff Utah State 
university of Agriculture and Applied Science (hereinafter "the Uni-
versity") seeks to recover from appellants and defendants third-party 
plaintiffs (hereinafter "the broker-dealers") various losses allegedly 
arising from an investment program which it conducted from September 
1970 to March 1973, on the sole ground that its securities purchases 
were ultra vires. The broker-dealers filed third-party indemnity 
actions based on misrepresentation against members of the University's 
Institutional Council and others who represented on numerous occasions 
by official corporate resolution that the University did have the 
power that the University now contends it lacks. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 3, 1979, the trial court entered orders in all these 
cases (1) granting the University's motions against all broker-dealers 
for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, and (2) deny-
ing the broker-dealers' motions to dismiss the University's complaints 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At the 
same time it also entered final judgment dismissing all third-party 
actions and counterclaims instituted by the broker-dealers. All 
broker-dealers appealed from those final judgments and also filed 
petitions for intermediate appeal from the court's order granting the 
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University's motion for partial summary judgment and denying the 
broker-dealers' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.!/ 
All broker-dealers but Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc. also filed motions to dismiss for lack of in personam juris-
diction and Merrill Lynch filed a motion for change of venue. These 
motions were denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The broker-dealers seek reversal of the trial court's order 
granting the University's motions for partial summary judgment and 
denying their motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and 
request that this Court remand the case with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of the broker-dealers pursuant to their motions to 
dismiss. If this Court does not order dismissal of the University's 
complaints, the broker-dealers seek, in the alternative, reversal of 
the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment and an order from 
this Court remanding the case for trial. The broker-dealers also seek 
an order reversing the trial court's dismissal of the broker-dealers' 
counterclaims and third-party complaints. In the alternative to the 
dismissal of the University's complaints, the broker-dealers also seek 
reversal of the orders denying their motions to dismiss for lack of in 
personam jurisdiction and, in the Merrill Lynch action only, reversal 
of the order denying its motion for change of venue. 
i. Subsequently, this Court granted the brokers' petitions for 
intermediate appeal and consolidated the two sets of appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Introduction 
A brief sununary of the genesis and development of this litiga-
tion may assist the Court in understanding the posture of these 
cases before it proceeds to review the ensuing detailed discussion 
of the facts. 
In 1970, University officers, at the direction of the Univer-
sity's Institutional Council, launched a new and aggressive investment 
program and began opening accounts with the defendant broker-dealers 
so that the University could buy and sell securities, including common 
stocks.Y The program was "aggressive" in the sense that it was not 
restricted to the classes of securities historically purchased by 
institutional investors . .v' All those accounts were opened pursuant 
to official corporate resolutions adopted by the Institutional Council 
which represented to the broker-dealers that the University had 
power to purchase the securities·at issue.!/ 
Once the broker-dealers had received those express warranties 
from the Council, they carried out the hundreds of orders for pur-
2. Exhibit 49 to all depositions; Robins depo. at 18-19. Each 
exhibit identified herein is part of one set of exhibits utilized 
in all these depositions. 
3. September 19, 1970 Institutional Council resolution addressed 
to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exs. 7, 8 and 9. 
4. Copy of resolution of January 20, 1972 is attached hereto 
as Appendix B. Institutional Council adoption of first resolu-
tion to Merrill Lynch on September 19, 1970, Exhibits 8 and 9 to 
depositions; Council adoption of resolutions on January 16, 1971 
and April 24, 1971 to broker-dealers not parties to these appeals, 
Exs. 16, 86 (minutes of January 16, 1971 meeting), 38; Council 
adoption of resolution on Janyary 20, 1972 sent to.all broker-
dealers, Exs. 86 (minutes of January 20, 1972 meeting) and 33; 
Council adoption of second specific resolution addressed to Merrill 
Lynch on September 30, 1972, Ex. 46. Receipt of resolutions by 
broker-dealers: Merrill Lynch, R. 1437-39; Bear Stearns, R. 2003; 
Sutro, R. 125-26; Hornblower, R. Vol. 22, 1975. In all instances in 
which similar documents appear in all files, citations herein will 
be to the Bear Stearns file only. 
_,_ 
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chases and sales of conunon stock placed by Mr. Catron, the Univer-
sity's investment officer. In almost all of those instances the 
broker-dealers acted only as agents for the University and its pur-
chasers or sellers, and only on a few occasions did any of them make 
reconunendations that the University purchase any particular stock.~ 
The University heirarchy never once advised the broker-dealers 
during this time that it might possibly lack power to make the invest· 
ments which it regularly ordered them to make on its behalf, even 
though it had ready access to the legal staff of the Utah Attorney 
General's office. After all of the transactions here at issue had 
been fully executed, a general economic recession occurred and the 
University's portfolio declined in value. 
The Unive~sity then instituted suit in federal court against all 
these broker-dealers, suing on various provisions of the federal 
securities laws and also raising claims essentially identical to those 
claims presently before this Court on these state court actions.~/ 
Judge Anderson of the United States District Court for the District of 
S. Defendant Hornblower acted only as an agent for the Univer-
sity in all of these transactions. Affidavit of Peter A. Nalewaik 
of July 21, 1976, Hornblower, R. 73. Defendant Sutro acted only 
as an agent for the University in every transaction but one. It 
acted as a principal in the University's transactions for Hanover 
Square debentures, but that single transaction comprises an in-
significant part of the University's claim against it. Supple-
mental Affidavit of Felix M. Juda, Sutro, R. 1973. Defendant 
Bear Stearns acted primarily as an agent for the University, and 
acted as principal only in those transactions listed in the 
Affidavit of David Cranston, dated July 28, 1977, Bear Stearns, 
R. 1998. 
6. The University's subsequent appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is a reported decision of 
which this Court may take judicial notice. Utah State Univ. of 
Agriculture and Applied science v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 
164 (10th Cir. 1977). A cursory review of the first few pages of 
that decision, in which the appeals court discussed the nature of 
the University's claims, demonstrates the similarity .of its 
claims in federal court to its claims in state court. The appel-
late court also expressly noted the fact that the University 
there alleged pendant claims under state law. Id. at 166. 
-4-
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Utah granted the broker-dealers' motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment in those actions, all of which were based upon the 
broker-dealers' assertion that the University failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted,l/ and the University then unsuccess-
fully appealed that ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit and sought certiorari to the United States Supreme 
court, which was denied.~/ 
The Tenth Circuit's decision was a unanimous ruling that the 
University's theory of recovery, including its theory of selective 
recission, was untenable. One passage in that decision is a cogent 
summary of the broker-dealers' position on the present appeals:21 
The argument that the brokers are liable because 
they should have known that the stock purchases 
by USU were illegal under Utah law does not im-
press us. USU seeks to take advantage of its own 
wrongful acts. It would retain the profits which 
it has made and recover from the brokers the losses 
which it has sustained. An ultra vires act of an 
institutional customer may not be converted into a 
wrongful act of a broker.' 
At that point, the University then instituted suit in state court, 
raising in that forum the common law claims which it had unsuccess-
fully raised as pendent causes of action in its federal suits. 
It should be noted at this point that the broker-dealers are not 
appealing herein from the trial court's dismissal of their third-party 
actions against the Institutional Council as an entity, but are appeal-
ing only those third-party judgments entered in favor of the indivi-
7. The brokers' motions to dismiss, and the motion of Merrill 
Lynch for judgment on the pleadings rather than to dismiss, are 
discussed in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Utah State University, 
supra, id. at 171. 
8. 434 U.S. 890 (1977). 
9. 549 F.2d at 168 (emphasis added) . 
.............__ -s-
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duals who were on the Council or were University officers. Nor do 
the broker-dealers appeal herein from judgments entered in favor of 
the two banks whom they had sued on third-party actions below. To 
summarize, these appeals are concerned only with the following rulings: 
1. The trial court's entry of partial summary judgment in 
favor of the University and its denial of the broker-dealers' motions 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim; 
2. The court's dismissal of the broker-dealers' counterclaims; 
3. The court's dismissal of the broker-dealers' third-party 
actions against Institutional Council members and University officers 
in their individual capacities; and 
4. The court's denial of the broker-dealers' motions to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction and Merrill Lynch's motion 
for change of venue. 
A. The University's Investment Program. 
Not one of the facts presented here has been controverted by any 
party. All of these facts except those identified as deposition 
testimony or exhibits were presented to the trial court before it 
dismissed the broker-dealers' third party actions and counterclaims, 
and all these facts were presented to the court before it granted the 
U • • t I t • f • 1 • d lQ/ niversi y s mo ions or partia summary JU gment.~ 
10. Many of the facts set forth herein were first presented to 
the court below at length in the brokers' joint memorandum in 
support of their motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, filed May 16, 1977. Bear 
Stearns, R. 553. Each of the ultimate facts asserted in opposi-
tion to the third party defendants' motions to dismiss and for 
summary judgment are pled in the brokers' third party complaints 
and summarized at 4-8 of the brokers' joint memorandum in oppo-
sition to those motions to dismiss, alternative motions for 
summary judgment, and the University's motion to dismiss the 
counterclaims, filed on November 3, 1977. Bear Stearns, R. 1151. 
Finally, all the facts set forth herein were argued to the 
court below in the brokers' joint memorandum in opposition to 
the University's motions for partial summary judgment, filed 
May 16, 1978. Bear Stearns, R. 2005. The court below inadvert-
ently omitted to file that memorandum with the Sutro pleadings, 
but it was aware that the identical memorandum was filed in all 
four cases, and the memorandum bears a designation for the Sutro 
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1. Origin of the Investment Program and Policy. 
In response to criticism from State officials of the University's 
practice of leaving idle cash balances in local banks, 111 and in 
order to increase the University's financial resources, the Institu-
tional Council formulated and launched the University's securities 
investment program in mid-1970. Virtually all of the hundreds of 
securities purchased by the University between mid-1970 and March 1973 
(the period at issue) were of a kind not designated in Utah Code Ann. 
§33-1-1. 
One of the first actions the Institutional Council took in em-
barking upon the investment program was to approve a formal corporate 
resolution on September 19, 1970, addressed to defendant Merrill 
Lynch. The resolution stated, inter alia, that the University was 
"authorized and empowered to open and maintain an account with Merrill 
Lynch . for the purchase and sale of stocks, bonds or securities 
" that the University's Vice President of Business and Treasurer, 
Dee A. Broadbent, and its Controller, Donald A. Catron, were authorized 
to place orders for securities on the University's behalf, and that 
the resolution would remain in effect until revoked in writing. 12/ 
On the same day, the Institutional Council commissioned President 
Taggart to form an investment committee for the purpose of formulating 
. l' 13/ an investment po icy.~ The investment committee was composed of 
11. In the sununer of 1970 the Governor of Utah reduced the 
University's budget by two percent. Glen Taggart depo. at 33. 
In response to University President Taggart's inquiry as to how 
the University might make up this loss, the State Board of Higher 
Education advised the University by letter to invest its idle 
funds. Id. at 33-34. A few months prior to this, the Utah State 
Auditor had criticized the University for leaving idle large 
excess cash balances in local bank accounts. Ex. 4. 
12. Exs. 7, 8, 9, Bear Stearns, R. 2003. 
13. Ex. 7. -7-
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three members of the Institutional Council 141 and three members of the · 
dm 
. . 15/ University a inistration.~ 
In order to formulate such a policy, and after the University hac 
already been engaged for several months in purchasing securities not 
mentioned in Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1, certain members of the Investment 
Committee!§./ and Catron and Broadbent attended an investment seminar 
in San Francisco sponsored by the Ford Foundation on the subject of 
securities investments by institutions of higher learning. 17/ They 
returned with a Ford Foundation report entitled Managing Educational 
Endowments, 18/ and Councilman Plowman gave an oral report on the 
seminar to the entire Council on February 23, 1971. 191 
Three of the themes put forward by the Ford Foundation at the 
seminar, and in the publication prepared by it, influenced and became 
a part of the University's investment program. One theme was that in 
the past those who managed portfolios of educational institutions had 
lost, because of inflation, more money by being conservative in secu-
rities investments than by being aggressive, and that portfolio manager! 
should move from fixed income securities to equity securities, ~' 
14. Council Chairman Bullen and Councilmen Plowman and 
Stockdale. Ex. 10. 
15. Vice President Dee Broadbent, Donald A. Catron, and Jerry 
Sherrat. Id. 
16. Council Chairman Bullen and Councilman Plowman. Plowman 
depo. at 24; Ex. 17 at 6. 
17. Id. 
18. Stockdale depo. at 34-35; Ex. 96. 
19. Ex. 17 at 6-7, Institutional Council meeting minutes of 
February 23, 1971. 
-8-
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20/ 
to stocks.-
The Ford Foundation report also recommended that institutions not 
be restricted to "conventional blue chips" in common stock invest-
rnents. 211 The report stated221 that the traditional reason for invest-
ing in blue chips 
largely disappears when the primary emphasis is 
shifted from avoiding losses to maximizing the 
long-term return. . . • With a rapid advance in 
technology and the resulting growth of major new 
industries, many of the smaller and newer companies 
are growing far more rapidly than the big ones, and 
their stocks can offer rewards sufficiently large 
to completely outweigh any additional risks. 
A third theme of the Ford Foundation report was that decisions to pur-
chase or sell particular securities should be delegated to a single 
• h 1 • b h • • • . I 2 3/ manager wit regu ar review y t e institution s trustees.-
The University incorpo~ated all these principles into its invest-
ment program. It subsequently invested in numerous common stocks, 
some of which could not be called "blue chips," and delegated the day-
to-day decisions to buy and sell to a single individual, Hr. Catron. 
The identity, costs, sales prices, and current value of all the secu-
rities purchased by the University were all reported to the Investment 
20. Ex. 96. 
21. Ex. 96 at 16. 
22. Id. at 31-32. 
23. Id. at 31. 
-9-
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committee and the Institutional Council on a regular and periodic 
basis).!/ 
2. The Council Authorizes A Margin Account. 
In January 1972 the Council approved a new "broader" corporate 
resolution, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B, which 
represented that the University had power to purchase "securities of 
every nature on margin or otherwise," and which again authorized 
Broadbent and Catron to purchase and sell securities on the Univer-
sity's behalf.~ A copy of this resolution went to each of the 
broker-dealers.~ At the time this resolution was approved by the 
Council, at least five Council members fully understood what a margin 
account with a securities brokerage firm was and understood that it 
involved borrowing from the brokerage firm. 271 
Councilman Olsen, then Chairman of the Business Affairs Commit-
tee, testified in his deposition that there was "quite a discussion" 
24. !:..s...:..• Broadbent depo. at 100; Hammond depo. at 17, 27; 
Taggart depo. at 120-29; Plowman depo. at 30-31; Bingham depo. 
at 12-13; Stockdale depo. at 42. Typical of those reports are 
Exs. 30 and 43. Admissions by Institutional Council members that 
they had received and reviewed such reports appear at, ~· 
Harris depo. at 26, 50; Plowman depo. at 30-31; Stockdale depo. 
at 42. Furthermore, the minutes of the Business Affairs Committee 
meeting of June 26, 1971, record the distribution to all Council 
members of the March 31, 1971 investment position, which appears 
as the second to last page of Ex. 23. The Business Affairs 
Committee meeting minutes of March 25, 1972 record that the report 
of securities held by the University as of February 29, 1972 was 
distributed to all but two of the Council members. Ex. 86, March 
25, 1972 meeting; Ex. 36. 
~5. Ex. 86, January 20, 1972 meeting; approval of the resolu-
tion by the Instututional Council as reflected in the Council 
meeting minutes of that day, Ex. 33 at 4. 
26. See note 4 supra. 
27. Council members Bullen, Hammond, Harris, Olsen and Bingham. 
Bullen depo. at 38, Hammond depo. at 11, Harris depo. at 25, 
Olsen depo. at 10, Bingham depo. at 9. 
-ln-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services a d Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
about this new resolution, and that Councilmen Harris and Robins 
expressed concern about the University purchasing securities on margin 
at that meeting.~/ Notwithstanding those concerns, the new resolu-
tion was approved by the Council and was subsequently forwarded to all 
broker-dealers. A margin account, however, was opened with Merrill 
Lynch only, and interest paid to Merrill Lynch by the University on 
that account. 
3. Initial Success of the Investment Program. 
For the first year and a half the University's investment pro-
gram achieved remarkable results. As of March 31, 1972, the Univer-
sity had an unrealized gain of some $2.25 million.~/ Vice President 
Broadbent testified that Council members were "awful happy. They 
never saw so much money made in their lives." 301 At the business 
affairs committee meeting of March 25, 1972, Councilman Harris, then 
Chairman of that committee, praised the investment program. 31/ 
Council members and the University administration were, however, fully 
aware of the risks they were undertaking in their objective to maxi-
mize return on University investments. 
4. Council Awareness of the Risks of the University's 
Investment Program. 
President Taggart, for example, testified at his deposition that 
when the University entered into the investment program, he was aware 
that this new "aggressive" approach carried the risk of higher losses 
as well as the opportunity for higher returns, but that nonetheless 
28. Olsen depo. at 58, 64-66. 
29. Ex. 58; Harris depo. at 32. 
30. Broadbent depo. at 119. 
31. Ex. 36. 
-11-
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. . , . h' d' . n32/ he "did not consider it inappropriate to go t is irection. -
on June 11, 1971, Councilman Stockdale wrote a letter to Council 
Chairman Plowman which remarked on the "almost unbelievable success" 
of the program to that time, but which concluded with a prophetic 
warning:E/ 
I am 100 percent in favor of getting every penny 
we can from our idle funds but I do believe that 
we have a serious charge placed upon us when we 
invest public funds. If we do well, very few will 
remember but if some institution in the State of 
Utah should make a blunder and lose a half million 
dollars we would see criticism levied and legisla-
tion enacted which everyone would be sorry to see. 
Mr. Stockdale advised Mr. Plowman in that same letter that he was 
"afraid" that he had "developed a much more ·conservative attitude" 
about the stock market than that which governed the University's 
investment program. 
Council Chairman Robins wrote to Councilman Harris, Chairman of 
the Business Affairs Committee, on October 31, 1972, and advised Mr. 
Harris, after referring to "substantial losses we have incurred on our 
current portfolio" by that date that: 34 / 
As you know, Jay Dee, I have sustained a fairly 
strong position advocating an investment policy 
designed to earn income well above the normally 
accepted "fixed rates of return." By its very 
nature this position implies that earnings will be 
large at times and losses will be suffered during 
other periods. 
In April 1972, Councilman Harris expressed fear that the Univer-
sity would lose the substantial profits it had already accrued unless 
32. Taggart depo. at 41. 
33. Ex. 21. 
34. Ex. 48 at 2 (emphasis added). 
-12-
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it abandoned its aggressive investment policy. At an investment com-
mittee meeting on that date which he had called, he explained that:.12./ 
The meeting was called to get the University to get 
out of the investment business, and that was my 
recommendation even though the notes [minutes of 
the meeting] didn't show just that plain. But I 
said: "Look, you're sitting on a two and a quar-
ter million dollar profit today," and that's the 
only profit anyone knew about in April because you 
had your March earnings report. "You've got only 
one way to go and that's lose it the way the inter-
est market is going." 
The investment committee did not follow Mr. Harris' recommendation. 
All others present voted for the continuance of the prograrn. 36/ 
At an investment committee meeting on November 10, 1972, seven 
Council members were advised that analysts and economists "do not pre-
dict a rosy picture for the stock market" for the corning year.11/ 
Councilman Hammond inquired:~/ 
Is there any thought that we should be a little rno~e 
conservative and work out a balanced investment pro-
gram? I question whether we should invest so much 
in common stocks. 
From my observations our present policy will make us 
the most money and lose us the most, also. 
On November 10, 1972, Councilman Harris advised the Council that 
a decision would be made within three months to consider "putting more 
money into conservative items instead of those that carry high risks. 11391 
35. Ex. 39; Harris depo. at 31-32 (emphasis added). 
36. Harris depo. at 32; Ex. 39. 
37. Ex. 49. 
38. Id. 
39. Ex. 91 at 8 (emphasis added). 
-13-
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Mr. Harris believed the University had some high risk investments as 
early as April 1972. 40/ At the same meeting, however, Council Chair-
41/ 
man Robins argued that:~ 
I have maintained this position very strongly that 
we have an obligation to achieve rates of return 
higher than normal. I believe the market's trend 
over the past 100 years has gone up. Generally the 
trend is going to continue to go up. 
Despite these strong concerns and the Council's full recognition 
of the high risks attendant to the kind of securities purchases they 
were making, no member of the Council ever moved at any Institutional 
Council meeting prior to December 1972 that the University's invest-
ment program be changed or that particular securities or classes of 
securities be sold. In December 1972 the Board of Higher Education 
ordered the Institutional Council to liquidate the high risk portion 
of its portfolio. By that time, a recession had occurred and many 
of the securities which the University had purchased had significantly 
declined in value. 
5. Demise of the Investment Program. 
The catalyst for the Higher Board's directions to the Institu-
tional Council was an audit performed by Ernst & Ernst in the sununer 
of 1972. In late November 1972, during the course of that audit, the 
accountants asked the Attorney General for his opinion of the legality 
of the University's investments.~/ Before the Attorney General had 
responded in writing to that inquiry, certain members of the Higher 
Board met with some Institutional Council members and University 
40. Harris depo. at 39-40. 
41. Ex. 49. 
42. Ex. 79. 
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-officers in Salt Lake City, on December 4, 1972.il./ At that meeting, 
the Higher Board first directed the University to take "public funds 
out of securities other than those specifically ordered by statute."!!/ 
Less than two weeks later the Attorney General issued a written 
opinion that it was unlawful for the University to invest State funds 
45/ in types of securities not designated in Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1,- and 
within a week the Higher Board again instructed the Institutional 
council by letter to liquidate all its securities which were outside 
the ambit of that statute.!§./ The University eventually did liquidate 
much of its portfolio, allegedly at a loss of several million dollars.!1/ 
6. The Council's Failure to Seek Legal Advice About the 
Legality of its Program. 
Until Ernst & Ernst asked the Attorney General for an opinion of 
the legality of the University's investments, no University officer or 
Council member had ever asked counsel that question, even though they 
knew they had access to the Attorney General for legal opinions on 
University business.~ They did not seek such advice even though 
43. Ex. BSD, January 10, 1973 minutes at 3. 
44. Id. 
45. A copy of that Attorney General's opinion is attached to 
each copy of the brokers' joint memorandum in opposition to the 
University's motions for partial sununary judgment, supra; n. 13 
as Ex. B. 
46. The letter from the Higher Board to the Institutional Coun-
cil containing these instructions appears at 3 of the January 10, 
1973 Council minutes, Ex. BSD. 
47. Those alleged losses are set forth with particularity in 
the Exhibit "A" attached to each of the University's complaints 
against each defendant. 
48. Councilman Olsen testified that the question of the Uni-
versity's capacity to invest was discussed, but he had no actual 
knowledge of this question ever being referred to the Attorney 
General. Olsen depo. at 20, 25, 30. 
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there were at least eight instances which might have raised this issue 
in their minds: 
a. The Institutional Council stated in the first paragraph of 
the Investment Position and Policy,i2/ formally adopted in 1971, that: 
Utah State University recognizes its responsibility 
to maximize the returns on the assets available for 
investment to support the University. As a public 
institution, it also recognizes its responsibility 
to protect the integrity of the public funds under 
its jurisdiction. 
b-f. The issue of the University's capacity to purchase securi-
ties was presented to the Institutional Council on at least five 
separate occasions from September 19, 1970 to September 30, 1972, when 
the defendant b~oker-dealers each submitted resolutions calling for ~ 
official declaration of the University's power.2.Q/ On each such 
occasion, the Council represented that the University had power with-
out limitation to purchase securities. 
g. The Ford Foundation report which Council members brought 
back with them from the January, 1971 seminar in San Francisco con-
tained a four page section entitled "Legal Questions", raising this 
issue. 51/ 
h. "Quite a number of the business officers" of the University 
subscribed to or regularly received a periodical published by the 
National Association of College and University Business Officers en-
titled The College and University Business Officer, Studies and 
Management. 521 The March 1972 issue contains an article entitled 
49. Ex. 24 (emphasis added). 
50. ~, Bear Stearns, R. 2003. 
51. Ex. 96. 
52. Broadbent depo. at 108. 
16 
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"Current Trends in College and University Investment Policies and 
Practices," which Vice President Broadbent had reviewed, and which 
states at one point that:2..V' 
Reports and articles are now accumulating with a com-
mon theme saying that revenue is anything legally avail-
able for expenditure. I would advise that an absolute 
first step is a written opinion by legal counsel for 
the specific institution. 
When most lawyers are asked for an opinion, they seek 
to refer to governing laws. 
Furthermore, although the Council was advised by the Attorney 
General in December 1972 that many of its investments were of ques-
tionable legality, it failed to advise any of the brokers of that fact 
or of the Attorney General's opinion until March 1973,W even though 
all the resolutions it had addressed to the broker-dealers had stated 
that those resolutions were to remain in full force and effect until 
expressly revoked in writing. 
7. Events From December 1972 to March 1973. 
During the interim from December 1972 to March 1973, Mr. Catron, 
the University's investment officer, not only failed to liquidate the 
University's portfolio, but instead began to purchase additional 
. · · 1 t 55 / Th C ·1 f ·1 d t d t th" securities in arge amoun s.~ e ounci ai e o e ec is 
actions because Catron falsified reports to conceal those purchases 
and because the Council failed to provide any controls over his invest-
ment decisions. 56/ Not only had the Council given Catron respons-
--
53. Ex. 35 at 3 (emphasis added). 
54. Broadbent depo. at 200, 275, 276; Ex. 63. 
55. For example, there is a statement to this effect by counsel 
for Utah State University. Broadbent depo. at 201. 
56. Id. 
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ability for making decisions to purchase or sell securities, he also 
had sole control over the reporting of those purchases and sales and 
sole control over the securities certificates. The State Auditor 
reached the following conclusions regarding this delegation of autho-
rity to Mr. Catron:221 
Adequate internal control procedures were absent 
permitting one person to completely control all 
aspects of the pooled investment program. Such 
centralized control exercised by one individual is 
completely contrary to all accepted principles of 
good fiscal management and prudent organizational 
control. 
The Council discovered that Catron had been falsifying reports a few 
days before it finally advised the brokers in March 1973 that his 
authority had been revoked.~/ 
Despite Mr. Catron's active buying during the three month period 
from mid-December to early March, many of the losses which the Univer-
sity seeks to recover occurred before December 1972. For example, the 
University seeks approximately one million dollars from Hornblower, 
which ceased doing business with the University altogether by the end 
of September 1972.~/ All purchases placed through Merrill Lynch 
ceased in October 1972.§.Q/ 
57. Ex. 64 at 19. Such adequate internal control procedures 
were absent even though the University's internal auditor, Elmer 
Watkins, had recommended such controls in 1971, in a document 
entitled "Audit Program for Investments." Ex. 73. Despite his 
recommendation of such controls in 1971, Mr. Watkins testified in 
his deposition that not one of those controls existed in the in-
vestment program. Watkins depo. at 32. 
58. ~, Broadbent depo. at 201. 
59. That Hornblower ceased doing business with the University 
by the end of September 1972 is indicated by the complaint in the 
Hornblower action, which notes no transactions after that date. 
60. The Merrill Lynch complaint so indicates. 
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8. The Broker-Dealers' Reasonable Reliance on Council 
Resolutions. 
Throughout the duration of the investment program, each of the 
defendant broker-dealers relied on the Council resolutions addressed 
to them, assuring them that the University had capacity and that 
Catron had authority to purchase and sell all manner of securities on 
the University's behalf. 611 In most of these transactions, as has 
been noted, they acted only as agents and received no profits from the 
transactions other than commissions. Within a few days or weeks after 
receipt of each of those commissions, the broker-dealers paid those 
amounts out to satisfy other obligations.§11 For that matter, amounts 
which they received on the few instances where they acted as principals 
were also paid out within a few days or weeks after the transactions 
had occurred.§]/ The broker-dea~~rs did not know that the University 
was paying for these securities with funds which legally could not be 
used for their purchase. 64/ Nor were they aware of any fact which 
might have led them to believe that Catron was using such funds. 651 
They simply had no information as to the source of the funds which 
61. Merrill Lynch, R. 1433 (Stromberg Affidavit); id. at 1422 
(Dunn Affidavit); Bear Stearns, R. 1998 (Cranston Affidavit); Vol. 
22, R. 1975 (Kaplan Affidavit for Hornblower); Sutro, R. 122 
(Juda Affidavit). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
-19-
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they received, and reasonably believed that those funds were properly 
used to purchase the securities which Mr. Catron ordered.§.§./ 
B. Progress of This State Court Litigation. 
1. Threshold Proceedings and Motions. 
In late 1975, after all the University's federal court lawsuits 
had been finally resolved in favor of these broker-dealers, the Uni-
versity began to institute these suits in First District Court in 
67/ Cache County.- The complaint in each case is nearly identical: the 
parties are identified, and the University clai:r:is that each defendant 
executed orders for purchases and sales of securities set forth in an 
attached exhibit "A" to the complaints and that each broker-dealer 
charged commissions for those transactions, "at the behest of Catron." 
Each complaint then alleges that the defendant carried out Catron's 
instructions, using funds belonging to the University, that the Uni-
versi ty has since sold those securities, and that as a result of those 
sales it has lost the amounts set forth in each Exhibit "A". The 
University then prays for recovery of all its principal losses, all 
commissions paid to each broker-dealer, both prejudgment and post-
judgment interest and the return of interest charges paid Merrill 
Lynch on its margin account.§.!!/ 
The three broker-dealers whom the University initially sued 
69/ • immediately removed each of the cases to federal district court- an. 
66. Id. 
67. The complaints appear at the following places in the record. 
Hornblower, R. 1, 47; Merrill Lynch, R. l; Sutro, R. 1, 94; Bear 
Stearns, R. 72. 
68. Bear Stearns, R. 72. 
69. Id. at 70. 
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. d' . f f ·1 1 . 101 d t' filed motions to ismiss or ai ure to state a c aim~ an mo ions 
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 711 The personal juris-
diction motions were filed by all broker-dealers except Merrill 
Lynch.12/ Although the broker-dealers requested oral argument on 
their threshold motions, the court ruled, in response to a motion to 
remand filed by the University, that the cases should be remanded to 
state court, and did remand them in June 1976 before reaching the 
broker-dealers' 12(b) (6) and personal jurisdiction motions.21/ 
Merrill Lynch then was sued and filed a motion for change of 
venue, seeking transfer of its case to Third District Court in Salt 
Lake County, on the grounds that it did business only in that county. 74/ 
The University filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the 
question of liability (reserving the question of damages for later 
determination) in the Sutro case only, 75 / and Sutro filed a motion to 
stay consideration of that summary judgment motion until the other 
70. Id. at 44. 
71. Id. 
72. Merrill Lynch was the only broker who acknowledged that it 
was doing business in the State of Utah, for which reason it did 
not file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Merrill Lynch has offices in the State of Utah only in Salt Lake 
County, however, and it therefore filed a motion for change of 
venue to the Third Judicial District Court. Merrill Lynch, R. 
19. Defendant Bosworth Sullivan, represented by other counsel in 
these proceedings, similarly filed a motion for change of venue 
which was resolved at the same time as the motion filed by Merrill 
Lynch. Id. at 233. 
73. Bear Stearns, R. 16. 
74. Merrill Lynch, R. 19. 
75. Sutro, R. 47. 
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threshold motions had been adjudicated by the court.2.2/ 
After all those motions had been filed the broker-dealers sug-
gested a sequence for considering them. The parties then briefed the 
personal jurisdiction and venue motions, and the court heard oral 
argument on those motions on October 18, 1976.ll/ All parties agreed 
at that hearing that the only issues before the court at that time 
1 . . d' . d 78/ were those of persona )Uris iction an venue.~ The court later 
denied the broker-dealers' motions on these two grounds . .22.I 
One week after the court's memorandum decision denying the per-
sonal jurisdiction motions, to the surprise of all parties, the court 
issued a second memorandum decision, denying the brokers' 12(b) (6) 
motions.~/ Inexplicably, the court also granted the University 
summary judgment against all broker-dealers despite the facts that Ill 
the broker-dealers and the University had stipulated that the court 
should resolve the threshold motions of personal jurisdiction and 
venue in all of the cases before proceeding to consider the Univer-
sity's motion for summary judgment in the Sutro action; (2) the Uni-
versity had not filed a motion for partial summary judgment against 
any broker-dealer but Sutro; (3) even in the Sutro case, Sutro had not 
yet had the opportunity to file any response to the University's 
motion, because the parties had agreed that none of the remaining 
76. Id. at 18. 
77. The transcript of that October 18, 1976 hearing has been 
transcribed and is part of this record on appeal. Vol. 34. 
78. Id. at 3. 
79. Bear Stearns, R. 292. 
80. Id. at 289. 
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motions would be briefed by the parties until the court had ruled on 
the threshold motions; (4) there had been no opportunity for oral 
argument of the University's motion before the court, despite the 
requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
local rules of practice, which provide for such hearing;!Jl (5) 
the University had filed no memorandum opposing the brokers' 12(b) (6) 
motions in any of these cases; and (6) the motions to dismiss had 
never been submitted for decision by any party as required by Rule 
2.8(c) of the Rules of Practice of District Courts in the State of 
Utah • .§1./ 
The broker-dealers responded by filing a motion to set aside the 
court's January 21, 1977 memorandum decision, on all the grounds just 
83/ noted.~ The parties eventually stipulated that the court should set 
81. Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P., provides that any motion for 
sununary judgment "shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing," and that adverse parties may serve oppos-
ing affidavits "prior to the day of the hearing." If the granting 
of a hearing was discretionary to the court, the rule would so 
provide or would be completely silent on the need for a hearing. 
Rule 2.8(e) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
of Utah further provides that any party resisting a dispositive 
motion "may request oral argument on that motion, and such request 
shall be granted unless the motion has been summarily denied." 
Sutro requested oral argument, Vol. 16, p. 98. 
82. Rule 2.B(c) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
of the State of Utah provides: 
The moving party may serve and file reply points 
and authorities within five (5) days after ser-
vice of responding party's points and authorities. 
Upon the expiration of such five (5) day period to 
file reply points and authorities, either party 
may notify the clerk to submit the matter for 
decision. 
83. Bear Stearns, R. 301. 
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aside orders it had entered consistent with its memorandum decision 
denying the broker-dealers' 12 (b) (6) motions and that the court shoulc 
also grant the broker-dealers' raotions to set aside the court's Januar 
21, 1977 memorandum decision which had granted the University summary 
judgment on liability . .§i/ The court did enter orders in accordance 
. 1 . 85/ 
with that stipu ation.~ 
2. TJie Broker-Dealers' First Rule 12{b) (6) Motions. 
In a second attempt to establish an orderly sequence for dispos-
ing of the remaining motions filed with the court, the parties each 
proposed a sequence for ruling on those motions, and the court ruled 
on May 9, 1977, that the remaining motions would be treated in the 
following order: (1) the broker-dealers' 12(b) (6) motions would be 
briefed, argued, and ruled upon first; (2) if the court then denied 
those 12(b) (6) motions, the defendants would be granted time to file 
answers and third-party complaints and to file a joint memorandum in 
opposition to all pending motions for partial summary judgment filed 
by the University, and (3) the court set a time at which it would then 
proceed to rule upon those motions. 8 ~/ All parties then filed memo-
randa with respect to the broker-dealers' 12(b) (6) motions,.§2/ which 
84. Id. at 420. 
85. Id. at 424, 428. 
86. Order of August 29, 1977. Id. at 836. While the court did 
not sign those orders until August"-;- it ruled during the course.of 
a hearing on May 6, 1977 that it would resolve all pending motions 
in the manner reflected in its August order. The reporter's 
transcript of the May 6, 1977 proceedings with respect to that 
scheduling order appear in the record as Vol. 35. 
87. Joint memorandum in support of motions to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, filed May 
26, 1977. Id. at 553. Utah State University filed a joint 
memorandum in opposition to the motions to dismiss for failu~e.to 
state a claim appears. Id. at 618. The defendants filed a Joint 
reply memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss appears. 
Id. at 659. 
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88/ 
the court denied on July 6, 1977 in another memorandum decision.~ 
3. The Third-Party Actions and Counterclaims. 
Following the denial of their Rule 12(b) (6) motions, the broker-
dealers filed answers and counterclaims to the University's complaints 
and also filed third-party complaints seeking indemnity and contribu-
tion against officers of the University, Institutional Council members, 
and others.~/. The broker-dealers also initiated discovery.2.£1 
All of the third-party defendants responded to the third-party com-
91/ plaints by filing motions to dismiss or for summary judgment~ and 
some third-party defendants moved to stay the broker-dealers' dis-
covery and the court so ordered. 921 The University also filed motions 
to dismiss the counterclaims filed by the broker-dealers against it.~/ 
88. Mem. Dec. filed July 7, 1977. Merrill Lynch, R. 391. 
89. Answer and counterclaim, Bear Stearns, R. 727. Third party 
complaints, id. at 748. 
90. The brokers filed a request for production directed to the 
third-party defendants, a separate request directed to the Coun-
cil as an entity, and requests for admission of fact and inter-
rogatories directed to the University. Id. at 1599, 1906, 1911, 
843, 776, 821, 902, 736, 846. 
91. In the Bear Stearns file, those motions are: motion of the 
Institutional Council to dismiss third-party complaints for fail-
ure to state a claim for relief, motion to strike, and motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, id. at 1727; motion of third party 
defendant to strike third-party plaintiff's complaints, id. at 
1057; motion of Utah State University to dismiss counterclaims, 
id. at 1035; motion of third-party defendant to dismiss third-
party complaints, id. at 1070; motion to dismiss third-party com-
plaint, or, alternatively, for summary judgment, id. at 925, 
1788. Similar motions appear in all related actions. 
1 ;~6. Motions to stay discovery, id. at 807, 813; order, id. at 
93. Bear Stearns, R. 1035. 
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The court heard oral argument on the foregoing motions on November 
21, 1977.2.1/ and in March 1978 granted all of the third-party defend-
ants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment and also granted 
the University's motion to dismiss the counterclaims.2..?f 
In addition, despite the court's own scheduling order, despite 
the fact that the broker-dealers had not yet been given an opportunity 
to respond to the University's motions for partial summary judgment, 
despite the fact that there had been no hearing on that motion, and 
despite the fact that the broker-dealers' discovery had been stayed 
by the court, the court once again granted the University's motions 
for partial summary judgment on liability.2..§1 And once again, in 
response to the broker-dealers' objection, the court entered another 
order withdrawing that portion of its memorandum decision which had 
granted summary judgment to the University. 97 / Thereafter, in late 
March and April 1978, the broker-dealers deposed, among others, 
those who had been members of the Institutional Council and officers 
of the University during the relevant time period.2.§/ 
94. The transcript of that hearing is Vol. 38 of this record 
on appeal. 
95. Mem~ Dec. filed March 3, 1978. Bear Stearns, R. 1775. 
96. Id. 
97. Order of March 21, 1978. Id. at 1841. 
98. Identical notices of deposition and subpoenas were filed 
in all related actions. The defendants' notices of taking depo-
sitions appear in the Bear Stearns file at 901, 782, 1812, 1920, 
1793, 1893. Subpoenas Duces Tecum appear in that file at 1805 
(directed to Dee Broadbent) and 1808 (directed to Ernst & Ernst). 
The depositions taken by all defendants in these related cases 
are volumes 41 through 62 of this record on appeal. 
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4. Final Rulings on the University's Partial Sununary 
Judgment Motions and the Broker-Dealers' Second Rule 12(b) (6) Motions. 
All parties briefed the University's motions for partial swrunary 
judgment in accordance with the court's scheduling order and the 
broker-dealers renewed their motions to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim.22./ Defendants Merrill Lynch and Shearson Hammill also filed 
motions for summary judgment on the grounds that the University had 
ff d d 1 f . . . h 100/ su ere no amage as a resu t o its transactions wit them.~-
On October 27, 1978, the court for the third time prematurely 
granted the University's motions for partial swrunary judgment and for 
the second time denied the broker-dealers' motions' to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. 1011 The court so ruled without permitting 
the broker-dealers a hearing which they requested and to which they 
were entitled. 1021 The court explained the basis for its decision: 1031 
99. Second motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. Bear Stearns, R. 1984. 
100. The memorandum filed by both those brokers appears in the 
Merrill Lynch file, R. 1401. 
101. Mem. Dec. filed October 27, 1978. Bear Stearns, R. 2183. 
102. Id. at 1987. 
103. Id at 2185-86. 
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This Court has repeatedly stated and now holds that 
in this case there are more than two parties inter-
ested in this matter and who have financial interest 
other than Utah State and the brokers and that is 
the taxpayers whose money was used in these trans-
actions and whose money was lost by reason of these 
transactions. This Court feels that the brokers 
cannot escape liability for their illegal acts, acts 
with which they are charged legally with knowing to 
be illegal by saying officials of Utah State also 
knew this and were charged with this knowledge. The 
Court feels where a governmental entity is involvecl" 
and the parties are char~ed with the legal use of 
public funds that the ot er illegal party cannot 
escape liability by sayini the specific party we 
dealt with does not come into this matter with clean 
hands either. 
In other words, the court ruled that, as a matter of law and regard-
less of what the facts might be, private parties dealing with govern-
mental entities are strictly liable in ultra vires cases because they 
are charged with knowledge of that illegality, and that the government 
itself is never charged with the consequences of its own illegal 
actions. 1041 
Thereafter, following further proceedings to obtain final judg-
ment in the third party actions, the broker-dealers (1) petitioned for 
intermediate appeal from the court's partial summary judgment ruling 
and its denial of their motions to dismiss and (2) filed final appeals 
from the third-party action dismissals. All those appeals have now 
been consolidated and this Court will be able to give the trial court 
H 
the guidance it sought in its memorandum decision of January 9, 1979:-
[The Supreme Court can] make first a decision on lia-
bility. Of course, if they find no liability this 
would necessarily be as far as they would have to go 
and would decide all issues. If they decide there is 
liability on the part of the brokers to Utah State, 
they can then determine the position of the third 
party defendants. 
104. The court so ruled even though both the court and counsel 
for the officers and Council members had indicated that those 
individuals should probably be charged with constructive knowledge 
that.these transactions were ultra vires. Tr. of Nov. 21, 1977 
hearing at 23 (remarks of the court) , 57 (remarks of Mr. Campbell) (Vol. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
These cases present to this Court a major issue of public policy. 
That issue is whether there are, under any conceivable state of facts, 
any limits on the ability of the sovereign to recover against its 
innocent agents the losses which it sustains as a result of the pro-
prietary and ultra vires conduct, negligence and irresponsibility of 
its own high public officers. These cases are before this Court, not 
after complete discovery and trial, but from Rule 12(b) (6) motions and 
motions for summary judgment. 
Of course, on an appeal from a motion to dismiss, every allega-
tion in the third-party complaint must be deemed to be true. 1061 To 
affirm the trial court's ruling on partial summary judgment, this 
Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the broker-
dealers and must find that there are indeed no material issues of fact 
created by any one of the broker-dealers' affirmative defenses. 1071 
To affirm that partial summary judgment ruling, this Court must rule 
that the broker-dealers must be liable to the University regardless of 
the degree of wrongdoing by its own officers, regardless of the fact 
that the University here seeks to sue on contracts which it claims are 
illegal, and regardless of the fact that no private corporate or 
individual plaintiff could recover under facts similar to those al-
ready adduced in these cases. 
Food Mach. & Chem. Cor ., 
ru e 
107. Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co., 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d 
758 (1967). 
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To affirm the decision below, this Court must bow to the archaic 
and discredited concept that the King can do no wrong in propriety 
as well as in governmental activities. To affirm the trial court's 
rulings, this Court must agree with the court below that the taxpayers 
are talismanic, that if any of their tax monies were ever paid on an 
ultra vires contract their money must be recovered by the sovereign 
who expended it, and that the sovereign may recover, not only against 
the parties to his transaction, but also against persons who acted 
only as intermediaries in those transactions, who received no profits 
apart from small commissions, and who are guilty of no wrongdoing 
greater than scrupulously following the instructions of the sovereign 
in carrying out those transactions. The Court must also rule that 
those private parties may not recover on those facts against the high 
public officers who induced them to carry out business for the sever-
eign. 
When the trial court ruled, it did know that University officers 
and Council members had actual notice of every transaction at issue 
here, and had approved or ratified each such transaction both before 
and after it was executed, and had represented to the broker-dealers 
by official corporate resolution that the University had the power 
the University now denies. The trial court agreed that those persons 
must be charged with constructive notice that their conduct was ultra 
. 108/ . h 
vires,-- ~· that their conduct in supervising and approving t ese 
purchases was in excess of their statutory authority. It knew that 
those persons had been criticized by the State Auditor for delegating 
so much responsibility to Mr. Catron (negligence), and that they did 
108. Tr. of Nov. 21, 1977 hearing at 23 (Vol. 38). Counsel for 
most of ~he individual third party defendants essentially con-
ceded this at the same hearing. Id. at 57 (remarks of Mr. 
Campbell). It is widely recognized that a public officer must 
take note of the extent of his own powers. ~· Casby v. 
Thompson, 42 Mo. 133 (1868); State v. Moreland, 152 Okla. 37, 3 
P.2d 803 (1931); Stone v. State, 260 Ala. 363, 71 S.2d 23 (1954)· Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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not advise the brokers that Catron's authority had been rescinded 
until March 1973 (a purely ministerial act). Its rulings in light of 
those facts are inexplicable and should be reversed. 
It will be assumed arguendo for purposes of all the arguments in 
this brief, except for Arguments VI and VII in Part One, that all the 
stock purchases and sales at issue herein were indeed ultra vires 
under state law. 
PART ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE UNIVERSITY'S 
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN 
DENYING THE BROKER-DEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY 
IS ESTOPPED TO RECOVER ON THE TRANSACTIONS AT ISSUE HERE. 
For nearly three years, from July 1970 to March 1973, the Univer-
sity's extensive investment program was closely supervised by the 
Institutional Council which instituted it. The Council's members were 
knowledgeable and sophisticated individuals, 1091 fully aware of the 
risks of loss which they had assumed for the University. To implement 
its carefully articulated goal of maximizing the University's invest-
ment returns, the Council approved at least five separate corporate 
resolutions addressed to the defendant broker-dealers, advising them 
that the University had power to purchase the securities at issue on 
margin or otherwise, that Broadbent or Catron had authority to order 
those securities on the University's behalf, and that all those reso-
lutions would remain in full force and effect until expressly revoked 
in writing. 
109. Brief biographical sketches of several council members, 
developed from their depositions, are attached as Appendix A to 
this brief. 
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Nearly all of the securities purchased by the University from 
July 1970 to March 1973 were of a kind not mentioned in section 
33-1-1 of the Utah Code. Assuming that the University could not 
lawfully purchase such securities, the trial court nevertheless should 
have held that the University is estopped from asserting claims for 
its investment losses against these broker-dealers, whose only sins 
were to believe and rely upon the formal action of the Institutional 
Council and religiously to carry out its instructions as its agents. 
A. Application of Estoppel in Government Cases. 
There are four elements of estoppel traditionally applied in 
suits involving both private and government parties, each of which is 
also present here: 
1. The party to be estopped must know the facts; 
2. He must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so 
act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is 
so intended; 
3. The latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and 
4 H t 1 h f I d h. . . llO/ . e mus re y on t e ormer s con uct to is inJury.~-
Despite the widespread application of the estoppel defense in 
private actions, the now largely discarded traditional view in the 
United States was that estoppel could not lie against the govern-
ment.111/ That principle has always been a branch of the doctrine of 
. . . 112/ 
sovereign immunity.~- Sovereign iwmunity of course shields the 
110. United States v. Georgia-Pacific co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th 
Cir. 1970), quoting Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 
100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960). 
111. 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §17.01 at 491 (1958). 
ll2. Id. 
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government from liability for its torts or breaches of contract. The 
traditional view of estoppel simply applied the same principle as a 
sword rather than a shield: the rule precluding estoppel meant that 
the government could not be barred from recovery against private 
parties regardless of its own torts or breaches of contract. 
Whatever policy arguments might ever have supported the universal 
application of either of those principles have been seriously eroded, 
however. 113 / The traditional doctrine was first reversed in cases 
where the sovereign had acted in a proprietary rather than in a govern-
mental capacity, i.e., where its conduct had a strong corollary in the 
marketplace and did not resemble the traditional functions of govern-
ing. ~· Greenhalgh v. Payson City. 114/ 
This Court has on several occasions recognized the impropriety 
of granting sovereign immunity to the government when engaged in 
proprietary functions: "Where a public body, which would otherwise be 
entitled to sovereign immunity, engages in an activity of a commercial 
or proprietary character, the protection does not exist." 1151 The 
brokers respectfully submit that few activities are more clearly "of 
a commercial or proprietary character" than the purchase and sale of 
the common stocks in the University's portfolio. 
In fact, this Court was one of the earliest jurisdictions to 
apply estoppel against a governmental body. In Wall v. Salt Lake 
113. Mounting criticism by commentators led the courts to aban-
don these doctrines. See, ~· Berger, Estoppel Against the 
Government, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 680, 686 (1954); Newman, Should 
Official Advice Be Reliable? -- Proposals as to Estoppel and 
Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 374 
( 19 5 3) . 
114. 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975). 
115. Nestman v. South Davis County Water Improvement Dist., 16 
Utah 2d 198, 201, 398 P.2d 203, 205 (1965). Accord: Gordon v. 
Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 288-89, 391 P.2d 430, 431-32 (1964). 
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City,116/ the Court estopped the municipality because of the equities 
. 117/ present in that case:~-
[Here] the municipality, by its own affirmative acts, 
declarations, and conduct, misled the party, or 
induced him to believe that he had the right to rely 
upon the assurances which the municipality, after a 
long period of time, sought to repudiate to his 
injury. 
Of course, not every representation by any governmental employee 
will give rise to a defense of estoppel. But where, as here, high 
ranking public officials reassure a private party who relies on their 
assurances of the validity of his action, estoppel will be applied by 
the courts. An early decision which is instructive on this question 
was issued by the United States Supreme Court one hundred years ago. 
Hackett v. City of Otawa.JJJ..../ The Court there held that officials of 
a municipal corporation who had represented under official corporate 
seal to a purchaser of municipal bonds that the bonds were being 
offered for a lawful purpose were estopped later to claim that the 
bonds were void and issued unlawfully. 
As in these cases, the public entity made a representation under 
formal seal to a private party engaged in business with it that it had 
capacity to undertake that business, the private contracting party 
relied to his detriment on that representation, and it subsequently 
appeared that the sovereign's action exceeded its power under law. 
The Court noted that the "recitals of the bonds, in themselves, fur-
nish no ground whatever to suppose that the Council transcended its 
authority, or issued them for other than [municipal] purposes. They 
116. 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 (1917). 
117. Id. at 601, 168 P. at 769. Accord: Tooele City v. 
Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 594, 116 P.2d 406 (1941) (affirming the 
estoppel principles expressed in Wall). 
118. 99 u.s. 86 (1878). 
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justify the opposite conclusion." 119/ It therefore estopped the city 
from declaring the bonds to be void. 
B. Estoppel Should Be Applied Because the Broker-Dealers Cannot 
Be Charged With Constructive Notice That These Transactions Were 
Ultra Vires. 
The trial court's sole basis for imposing liability on the def-
endants was its reiterated assertion that, because they are charged 
with constructive notice that the subject transactions were ultra 
vires, none of their affirmative defenses (including estoppel) could 
absolve them of liability on those transactions. 1201 The trial court 
erred in so ruling because the broker-dealers cannot be charged with 
constructive notice. 1211 The University should therefore be estopped 
119. Id. at 90. 
120. Memorandum Decision of Jan. 9, 1979 at 3, R. 2202 (Bear 
Stearns). 
121. The broker-dealers cannot be so charged because they did 
inquire about capacity and authority from the council, the gov-
erning body of the University. The cases support the logical 
conclusion that one who has made diligent inquiry is relieved of 
the burden of constructive notice: 
It if appears that the person sought to be charged 
with notice was not heedless of the warning signals, 
but made inquiry and used due diligence to discover 
the facts which were suggested by the facts of which 
he had knowledge, and yet failed to obtain knowledge 
thereof, the inference of notice is rebutted and he 
is not affected thereby. 
-- 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notice, §10 (citations omitted). 
Accord: Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Parsons, 54 Minn. 56, 55 N.W. 
825 (1893); Federman v. VanAntwere, 276 Mich. 344, 267 N.W. 856 
(1936); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Cody Finance Co., 214 
F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1954). 
Logically, the law is that if one is approached by an agent 
who represents that he has authority and that his principal has 
capacity to enter into a contract, the person to whom to go for 
reassurance of that capacity and authority is the principal him-
self, which the brokers did when they made these inquiries of the 
council. 
!:...9'...:_, American Surety Co. of New York v. Smith, Landeryou & Co., 
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to recover from them because its officers should be so charged, while 
the defendants are innocent of knowledge of illegality. 
In holding that the city was estopped from declaring the bonds 
void and in excess of its power, the Supreme Court concluded in 
Hackett that the private contracting party was not put on any notice 
that those bonds were unlawful because the city's affirmative mis-
representations relieved him from ascertaining the legal limits of its 
power to issue such bonds. Under such circumstances, the court con-
cluded, 122; 
It would be the grossest injustice, and in con-
flict with all the past utterances of this court, 
to permit the city, having power under some circum-
stances to issue negotiable securities, to escape 
liability upon the ground of the falsity of its own 
rearesentations, made through official agents and 
un er its corporate seal, as to the purposes with 
which these bonds were issued. Whether such repre-
sentations were made inadvertently, or with inten-
tion ••. to avert inquiry •.. the city, both 
upon principle and authority, is cut off from any 
defense •.•• 
The broker-dealers respectfully submit that a closer analogy to 
the facts present here would be difficult to create: in the cases, 
at bar, the governing body of the public corporation1231 warranted 
under its official seal that the corporation had capacity and that its 
designated agents had authority to engage in all the transactions 
which it now asserts were ultra vires, its sole basis for imposing 
liability on the private parties through whom it effected those trans· 
actions. Under such circumstances, the brokers were relieved of any 
141 Neb. 719, 4 N.W.2d 889 (1942); State Bank of Binghamton v. 
Bache, 162 Misc. 128, 293 N.Y.S. 667 (S.Ct. 1937); Dodd v. First 
State Bank & Trust Co., 64 S.W.2d 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). 
Cf. Standard Parts Co. v. D&J Inv. Co., 288 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1955). 
122. 99 U.S. at 96. 
123. ~, §§53-48-15, 53-48-19, Utah Code Ann. (1969). 
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duty they might possibly have had to inquire into state statutes on 
the University's capacity to purchase and sell securities, as was the 
bond purchaser in Hackett. Accordingly, the University should be 
estopped to recover from them. 
It is true that this Court has recognized the general principle, 
subject to exception, that persons dealing with public officers are 
bound to inquire into the limits of their authority. ~, First 
Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University. 124/ But in these 
cases, that duty of inquiry was fulfilled, as each of these brokers 
did in fact take action to resolve that precise question. 1251 There 
were no Institutional Council resolutions before the court in First 
Equity, so this issue was not addressed in that opinion. 
C. Impact of Estoppel in These Cases. 
To estop the University in these cases would not negate legisla-
tive restrictions on the University's investments. Indeed, following 
the investments at issue here the State Legislature, by the State 
Money Management Act of 1974, Utah Code Ann. §§51-7-1 et seq. (Supp. 
1977), clarified the University's power to invest in securities. 
Estoppel of the University in this case would not set a precedent for 
allowing public officers to legislate by administrative fiat in future 
circumstances, but would only relieve private parties in egregious 
instances, as this Court did in Wall v. Salt Lake City, supra, 1261 
from the consequences of their justified and detrimental reliance on 
sovereign warranties in limited circumstances where .the sovereign has 
acted in a clearly proprietary capacity. 
124. 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). 
125. I.e., they requested and received the Council resolutions. 
126. 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 (1917). 
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In the landmark decision applying estoppel to the goverrunent, 
the United States Supreme Court similarly allowed one individual to 
escape the burden of one statute, without relieving anyone else from 
compliance with that statute, under circumstances analogous to those 
present here. In Moser v. United States,
1271 a Swiss citizen relied 
on the express written assurances of a State Department officer that 
he would not be barred froin seeking American citizenship if he applied 
for an exemption from military service. In fact, however, a federal 
treaty provided that exemption from military service would bar ci tizer 
ship, so the public officer's warranty to Moser constituted an ultra 
vires promise to him. In allowing Moser to obtain citizenship despite 
1281 
the express provisions of the treaty, the Supreme Court explained:'--
Petitioner had sought information and guidance from 
the highest authority to which he could turn .. 
He was led to believe that he would not thereby 
lose his rights to citizenship. If he had known 
otherwise he would not have claimed exemption. In 
justifiable reliance on this advice he signed the 
papers sent to him by the Legation. 
D. This Court, Like the Majority of Courts, Should Allow 
Estoppel Under These Circumstances. 
In these cases, each broker asked for express assurances of the 
propriety of the University's conduct before agreeing to open an 
account for it, assurances which each broker received from the Counci 
and upon which each broker justifiably relied. As was Moser, the 
brokers were "lulled ... into misconception of the legal conse-
quences" of their actions,12V and the trial court should have held 
that the University was estopped to recover under those circumstances 
127. 341 U.S. 41 (1951). 
128. Id. at 46. 
129. Id. 
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In ruling for Moser, the Supreme Court simply applied in a govern-
mental context the elementary principle of agency law which has long 
held the principal bound by the representations of his agent.13 0/ 
Similarly, in City of Marseilles v. Hustis, l3l/ an Illinois 
court agreed in principle with ~ when it held that: 
The general principle that a person takes the risk 
that the government officer to whom he speaks has 
the authority which he purports to have is not 
applicable here in light of the rule cited earlier 
to the effect that the doctrine of estoppel can be 
invoked where a party is induced by the conduct of 
municipal officers and where in the absence of 
relief he would suffer substantial loss. 
In Franks v. City of Auroraf 32 I the Colorado Supreme Court estopped 
the City to repudiate the apparent authority of its city engineer, 
stating: 133/ 
In considering whether the undisputed facts result 
in defendants' liability, it may be assumed that the 
engineer had no actual authority to modify the terms 
of this contract. 
It seems inconceivable that a municipal corporation 
can virtually supervise every detail of performance 
of an entire project and can long thereafter repu-
diate the supervisory authority of its own engineer 
adopting in retrospect the position that a contract-
ing party should have disregarded the instructions 
of its own agent and should have adhered to the 
original specifications notwithstanding the engi-
neer's disapproval. As we view it, the undisputed 
facts support a conclusion of justifiable reliance 
on the appearance of authority which was exhibited 
by these defendants. [Emphasis added] 
Here, too, the Institutional Council and its Investment Committee 
were informed of every transaction upon which the University here 
130. ~· Restatement of Agency Second, §§140, 141, 143. 
131. 27 Ill. App. 3d 454, 325 N.E.2d 767, 769 (1975). 
132. 147 Colo. 25, 362 P.2d 561 (1961). 
133. 362 P.2d at 563. 
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seeks recovery over a period spanning almost three years. Each 
written resolution sent by the Council to the brokers was the subject 
of discussion at an Institutional Council meeting before its approval. 
Every element of estoppel, as applied against the government in the 
foregoing decisions and in many others, is present in these cases. 
The only law cited by the University in support of its recovery 
in these actions is a collection of cases exclusively from other juris-
dictions, most of which are more than thirty years old, many of which 
have subsequently been expressly overruled by later decisions in the 
same jurisdictions, and nearly all of which are limited to circum-
t t t · these cases.
134 / Th U · 't h h' d s ances no presen in e niversi y as ac ieve , 
by virtue of the trial court's ruling on partial summary judgment, a 
giant leap backwards in the law to an outmoded application of a branch 
of sovereign immunity, a sterile concept which has always been devoid 
of logic in circumstances like those present here. 
This Court should rule, in keeping with its own past decisions 
and the current majority of American courts, that the government must 
be estopped to recover under the circumstances present here. As 
Professor Davis has noted, the defense of estoppel against the govern· 
ment "now has almost uniform support of decisions of the 1970s: The 
135/ doctrine of equitable estoppel does apply to the government."--
134. The University's case are distinguished in the brokers' 
joint memorandum opposing partial summary judgment at 56-64 (R. 
2005, Bear Stearns file). 
135. K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies §17.01 
(1976). That the government is a state or local government as 
opposed to the federal government makes no difference. Id. 
§17.06. Cases cited by Davis as evidencing the majority-Position 
that s~ate and local governments can be estopped include, ~· 
Fredericksen v. City of Lockwood, 6 Cal. 3d 353, 491 P.2d 805, 99 
Cal. Rptr. 13 (1971); Yamada v. Natural Disaster Claims Comrn'n., 
54 Haw. 621, 513 P.2d 1001 (1973); Pilgrim Turkey Packers, Inc. 
v. Department of Revenue, 261 Or. 305, 493 P.2d 1372 (1972). 
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II. 
THE UNIVERSITY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RECOVER ON 
EXECUTED CONTRACTS EVEN IF THEY ARE ULTRA VIRES. 
The one case which the trial court continually invoked in the 
course of proceedings below was a decision by this Court which refused 
to enforce an executory ultra vires contract and which left the parties 
where it found them. First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State 
University. 1361 In that action, the plaintiff broker sought damages 
for securities which the University had ordered but never paid for. 
This Court simply applied in that case the long standing rule that 
parties to an illegal contract will be left where they are found. 1371 
The court below incorrectly concluded that, since the broker was 
not allowed to recover from the University in First Equity (on the 
grounds that the contract on which it sought recovery was ultra 
vires), it also follows that in these reversed situations, the Uni-
versity as a plaintiff is entitled to recover from the broker-dealers 
on its contracts, also on the sole ground that those contracts were 
ultra vires. Such a result is not only illogical but in fact derives 
no support from the First Equity decision, which simply refused to 
enforce an illegal contract. This Court should apply the same principle 
again in these cases and reverse the trial court's partial summary 
judgment order because of the fundamental principle that no one may 
recover on an executed illegal contract. 
This Court has previously applied the same doctrine and left the 
parties where it found them. In Moe v. Millard County School District, 1381 
136. 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975) · 
137. ~· second Russian Insurance Co. v. Miller, 268 U.S. 552, 
562 (1925); Restatement of Contracts, §598 at 1109 (1932). 
138. 54 Utah 144, 179 P. 980 (1919) · 
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a private contractor entered into a contract with the school district 
to supply plumbing and heating fixtures for a school building. The 
contract was declared void because it exceeded the constitutional 
debt limit. While recognizing that the contractor could not recover 
money still due on his ultra vires contract, this Court also held that 
the contractor was not required to refund any of the payments already 
made under that contract by the school district. The Court ex-
plained: 1391 
We cannot perceive the necessity of refunding the 
money that was paid [to the contractor by the school 
district]. To that extent the contract has been 
executed, and there certainly is no good reason why 
in equity that matter should be reopened 
As in Moe, a school here seeks recovery on executed, allegedly 
ultra vires contracts. All the purchases and sales of securities 
which were the subject of those contracts have been fully consummated. 
Each time that the University ordered stocks through any of these def· 
endants, it received precisely what it paid for. In Moe the contracto: 
was allowed to retain payment for those plumbing and heating fixtures 
which he had already installed in a school building and which the 
school district therefore was allowed to retain. In this case, the 
University also kept all the items, i.e., securities, which it ordered 
from the broker-dealers and therefore, as in Moe, the matter in equity 
should be treated as closed. 
In a later decision by this Court involving a contract between 
the same school district and another corporation, the Court again left 
the parties where it found them: 14 0/ 
139. Id. at 151-52, 179 P. at 983 (emphasis added). 
140. Millard School Dist. v. State Bank of Millard County, 80 
Utah 170, 185, 14 P.2d 967, 972 (1932) (emphasis added). 
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---
When an ultra vires contract with a corporation has 
been fully performed on both sides, neither party can 
maintain an action to set aside the transaction or 
to recover what has been parted with. In other words, 
neither a court of law nor a court of equity will 
interfere in such a case to deprive either the cor-
poration or the other party of money or property 
acquired under the contract. 
The University received precisely what it bargained for. The 
transactions are closed and equity requires that they remain closed. 
Such a result would also conform with the ruling of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the University's earlier 
federal suit, supra, that the University should not be allowed to 
"take advantage of its own wrongful acts. 11141/ 
B. Ultra Vires Payments Made Under Mistake of Law Cannot Be 
Recovered. 
The University has alleged, as its sole basis for seeking re-
covery, that the payments in question were either ultra vires or were 
made under a mistake of law. Payments made under a mistake of law may 
not be recovered. It is beyond cavil that private parties may not 
recover under such circumstances, and a number of courts have likewise 
applied this principle to cases involving the sovereign. The prin-
ciple is succinctly stated in the Restatement of the Law of Restitu-
tion, section 45: 
Except as otherwise stated in Sections 46-55, a 
person who, induced thereto solely by a mistake 
of law, has conferred a benefit upon another to 
satisfy in whole or in part an honest claim of 
the other to the performance given, is not entitled 
to restitution. 
141. 549 F.2d at 168. 
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Comment c elaborates: 
The rule stated in this Section applies to a per-
son who pays his own money or transfers his own 
things. It applies likewise to a payment by an 
agent who, having power to bind his principal by 
his negotiations with third persons, pays a debt 
which the principal does not owe but which, be-
cause of his mistake of law, the agent believes 
to be due. 
Precedents abound which rule that a party making voluntary pay-
ments under mistake of law may not recover. 1421 In a parallel case 
involving a broker, one court noted, "In the case at bar the con tract 
is fully executed and there is no valid claim that the defendant's 
perf orrnance . d f' . ,,143/ was in any way e icient. ~- Quoting from Cornet Theatre 
Enterprises v. Cartwright, 144/ that court concluded, "There is no 
equitable reason for invoking restitution where the plaintiff gets 
the exchange which he expected." 145 / The University has not alleged 
that the defendants' performance was in any way deficient. It has not 
alleged that it got anything from the exchange other than what it 
expected. There is therefore no possible reason to invoke restitu-
tion. Indeed, equity cries for a contrary result. 
The rule that voluntary payment made under mistake of law is not 
recoverable must be applied to transactions with the State of Utah, at 
least under the facts present here. When government enters into 
contracts it is governed by contract law -- whether it is the United 
States, a state, a municipality, or a college. As Justice Brandeis 
elaborated, "When the United States enters into contract relations, 
142. ~,Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U.S. 541 (1878); 
City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. 720 (1866); Connecti~ 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 95 Ind. 588 (1884). 
143. Richardson v. Roberts, 210 Cal. App. 2d 603, 26 Cal. Rptr. 
829, 831 {Dist. Ct. App. 1962). 
144. 195 F.2d 80, 83 (9th Cir. 1952). 
145. 26 Cal. Rptr. at 831. 
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its rights and duties are governed generally by the law applicable to 
contracts between private individuals." 146 / Like the United States, 
the State of Utah is likewise subject to the commercial law applicable 
to contracts between private individuals when it engages in commercial 
activity. It matters not whether the contracting party is "a State or 
a municipality or a citizen. ,,l 47/ 
For the independent reason that the courts abhor illegal con-
tracts and that they will leave the par~~es to those contracts where 
they find them, particularly where payment is made under mistake of 
law, this Court should reverse the trial court's partial summary judg-
ment in favor of the University and should remand the case with in-
structions to the court to enter judgment in favor of the broker-
dealers on their motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
III. 
TO ALLOW THE UNIVERSITY TO RECOVER AGAINST THESE 
BROKERS WOULD DENY· THEM DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF LAW. 
The trial court's denial to the brokers of all the affirmative 
defenses which they asserted in answering the University's complaints 
constituted a violation of the due process and equal protection 
148/ 
clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions.~- The court's 
ruling denied the brokers equal protection of the laws because the 
court engaged in a classification for purposes of this suit which is 
146. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1933). 
147. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1878). See,~, 
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); Cobb v. City 
of Malden, 105 F. Supp. 109, 112 (D. Mass. 1952). Accordingly, 
the general rule that payments made under mistake of law cannot 
be recovered is applicable in cases where the government is a 
party. OlyrnpIC Steamship Co. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 627, 
631 (W.D. Wash. 1958). Accord, Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 
U.S. 541 (1878); United States v. Edmondston, 181 U.S. 500 (1901). 
148. Utah Const. Art. I, §2; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 
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devoid of rational basis. The court denied the broker-dealers due 
process of law by its ruling that their property may be taken by the 
University despite all the de£enses they asserted which are usually 
available in actions like those at bar. 
The trial court's refusal to recognize the defense of estoppel 
in this proprietary conduct case constitutes an irrational and over-
broad classification, since the government's right to resist estoppel 
is properly no broader than its right to invoke sovereign immunity. 
The classification of the University as an entity immune from the 
defense of estoppel is irrational because it serves no legitimate 
state purpose, as both the legislature and this Court1491 have express: 
recognized that there is no justification for special treatment of the 
sovereign where it acts in a proprietary capacity. 
As explained earlier, the class of persons subject to the defense 
of estoppel has traditionally included all private plaintiffs, whether 
individual or corporate, and has also traditionally included sovereigr. 
1 . t. ff . . 1 . d' b . . 15 0' T p ain i s in cases invo ving or inary usiness transactions.~- o 
exempt the University from the class of those persons subject to the 
defense of estoppel must be based on some legitimate legislative or 
public policy purpose, which clearly does not exist here. The trial 
court's classification of the University cannot stand by virtue of 
149. Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §§63-30-3 et ~· Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1978). Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, 
801 (Utah 1975) ("It is therefore our conclusion that propr1eta0 
functions of a municipality are not within the coverage of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act."). To the same effect are Utah 
Supreme Court decisions preceding enactment of the Governmental 
!~unity Act. Nestman v. South Davis County Water Improvement 
~, 16 Utah 2d 198, 201, 398 P.2d 203, 205 (1965); Gordon v. 
Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 288-89, 391 P.2d 430, 431-32 (1964). 
150. ~, cases cited by Professor Davis in support of his 
conclusion that estoppel is freely available against the govern-
ment at this time, supra n. 135. 
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the equal protection principles expressed by this Court in Child v. 
. 151/ City of Spanish Fork:~-
[Individuals) may be treated differently by the law 
... which divides them into classifications, if 
the classifications have a reasonable relationship 
to a proper and lawful purpose, and if all persons 
within the same class are treated equally. 
Similarly, the special protection accorded to the University by 
the trial court offends due process of law, because the trial court 
stripped the defendant brokers of the defenses which they would have 
been entitled to had the state not been a party plaintiff. The 
Supreme Court of West Virginia, in a decision which is instructive 
here, held that the state was not entitled to assert the defense of 
sovereign immunity in response to a counterclaim filed against it by 
the defendant. State v. Ruthbell Coal Co. 152 1. Dismissing plaintiff's 
. . . 1 . d 153/ 
claim of immunity, the court exp aine :~-
Plaintiff first came into a circuit court far removed 
from the place of defendant's corporate activities, 
and hailed defendant . . . to the bar of that court. 
Why then is plaintiff not bound by the same rules of 
procedure as any party litigant? In invoking the 
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court .•• plaintiff, 
in our opinion, has taken the position of an ordinary 
suitor, and even if plaintiff is "a direct govern-
mental agency of the State", •.. the State has laid 
aside its sovereignty and the concomitant immunity 
from an action or suit ••• and defendant, there-
fore, is entitled to assert by pleading and proof 
all matters purely defensive. 
The court held that to deny defendant the right to counterclaim would 
violate due process: 154/ 
We think it would be unconscionable and contrary 
to the due process clauses contained in the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
151. 538 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1975). 
152. 133 W.Va. 319, 56 S.E.2d 549 (1949). 
153. 56 S.E.2d at 555. 
154. Id. at 556. 
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States, and Article III, Section 10 of the West 
Virginia Constitution, to permit the State, as a 
plaintiff, to bring a citizen into court for the 
purpose 0£ asserting liability against such citi-
zen, and then strip that citizen of all the pro-
cedural rights and defenses which he would have 
if the State had not been a party plaintiff. 
Likewise, in these cases, the trial court's refusal to recog-
nize the estoppel and other defenses as~erted by the brokers was a 
denial to them of due process of law. For these independent consti-
tutional reasons, the court's partial summary judgment ruling should 
be reversed, and the court below should be directed to enter judg-
ment in favor of the defendant brokers. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUM¥.ARY JUDGMENT FOR 
THE UNIVERSITY, BECAUSE THE BROKER-DEALERS WERE ONLY 
AGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY, NOT PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTIONS. 
Defendants Hornblower and Sutro acted only as agents for the Uni· 
versity in all of these transactions. 1551 Defendant Bear Stearns 
acted primarily as an agent for the University, and acted as princi-
1 1 . f . 156/ pa on y in a ew transactions.~- Merrill Lynch acted partly as a 
principal, but primarily as an agent. But the University made sub-
stantial profits on all securities purchased through Merrill Lynch, 
for which reason Merrill Lynch filed a motion for summary judgment in 
the court below. 157 All the defendant broker-dealers, when acting as 
agents, were paid by the University for securities purchased and the 
155. Affidavits cited supra n. 5. 
156. Affidavit of David Cranston, Bear Stearns action, R. 1998. 
15?. T~at motion was denied by the court below, not because the 
University had not in fact made money through Merrill Lynch, but 
only because of the court's uncertainty as to whether the Uni-
ve7sity's. theo7ies of recovery for prejudgment interest might 
still entitle it to some nominal recovery. Tr. of Dec. 4, 1978 
hearing at 8-11, 39. (Vol. 40). Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
broker-dealers in turn passed on these payments to the sellers of the 
securities. The broker-dealers only retained commissions for their 
services.158/ The University's ultra vires purchases and sales, 
therefore, were entered into with the third party sellers, not with 
these broker-dealers. 
Assuming arguendo that the University is entitled to unwind the 
hundreds of purchases it ordered over a three year period, the most it 
is entitled to recover from these broker-dealers is the benefit they 
received, which is limited to their commissions. It is well estab-
lished that an agent is not liable on a contract executed by him on 
behalf of another and for this reason the University may not recover 
its principal losses from these broker-dealers. 159/ 
l60.' In Unger v. Travel Arrangements, Inc.,~- a customer sued a 
travel agency to recover the amount he had paid the agency for a trip 
later cancelled by a steamship company which became insolvent. Since 
the travel agency had passed the money on to the steamship company in 
the reasonable belief that the .company was solvent, the court held 
that the most the plaintiff could recover was any commission retained 
J/ 162 ' by the travel agency . .1:.§_ The court ruled:~-· 
158. Affidavits cited supra n. 5. 
159. Fink v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 161 Colo. 342, 421 P.2d 
735 (1966); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. 
Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691, 535 P.2d 644 (1975); Seigworth v. 
State, 91 Nev. 536, 539 P.2d 464 (1975); Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §320 (1958). 
160. 25 A.D.2d 40, 266 N.Y.S.2d 715, 721 (S.Ct. 1966). 
161. 266 N.Y.S.2d at 721. 
162. Id. at 721-22, citing, ~, Restatement of Restitution 
§143(b}; Restatement cf Agency, §339(f); Weiner v. Roof, 19 Cal. 
2d 748, 752, 122 P.2d 896, 898 (1942). This principle reflects 
the majority view. ~· Bailey v. Reiman, 118 Cal. App. 2d 131, 
257 P. 2d 94 (1953) (where an agent receives and delivers property 
honestly and openly, the agent is not liable to anyone thereafter 
for money received and transmitted); Karras v. Trione, 135 Colo. 
229, 310 P. 2d 560 (1957) (rental agent not liable for return of 
rent deposit); United States Nat'l. Bank v. Stonebrink, 200 Ore. 
176, 265 P.2d 238 (1954). 
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The fact that the agent credits the principal with 
the amount received does not release the agent 
from his obligation to make restitution so long 
as he continues to hold the money on behalf of the 
principal, ..• but when the agent parts with the 
money in accordance with the agency, he is released 
from liability. 
Because the broker-dealers here no longer have possession of the 
funds paid to them by the University, the University may not recover 
from them. The trial court erred in granting the University partial 
summary judgment, and its order should be reversed. 
v. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE BROKER-DEALERS 
LIABLE TO THE UNIVERSITY BECAUSE THEY HAD REASONABLY 
AND IN GOOD FAITH CHANGED THEIR POSITION IN RELIANCE 
UPON THE REGULARITY OF THE TRANSACTIONS HERE AT ISSUE 
For nearly three years and on hundreds of occasions, the broker-
dealers received from the University payments for the purchases of the 
securities at issue here. In turn, the broker-dealers passed on to 
the University the security certificates and passed on the purchase 
price to the sellers. The broker-dealers retained only their commis-
sions as their benefit of the bargain. These commission payments were 
paid out through the ordinary course of business to satisfy the regular 
expenses of the broker-dealers. In so doing, the broker-dealers rea-
sonably and in good faith changed their position in reliance on the 
regularity of the transactions ordered by the University. The Univer-
sity should not be allowed to recover monies delivered to the broker-
dealers which haveong since been disbursed. 
Any action for restitution, including the actions brought here 
by the University, is based upon fundamental equitable principles. 
As explained in comment C to Section 1 of the Restatement of Resti-
tution: 
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Even where a person has received the benefit from 
another, he is liable to pay therefor only if the 
circumstances of its receipt or retention are such 
that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for 
him to retain it. 
or, as Justice Cardozo succinctly explained, "The plaintiff must show 
that it is against good conscience for the defendant to keep the 
163/ 
money."--
The expenditure of funds wrongly received is a significant 
change of circumstances that warrants denial of restitution. Sawyer 
164; 
v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp .. --
Because the broker-dealers changed their position over a three 
year period and relied in good faith on the regularity of the numerous 
transactions at issue, the University should in equity be precluded 
from undoing those transactions. The trial court's judgment in favor 
of the University on liability should therefore be reversed. 
163. Schank v. Schuchman, 212 N.Y. 352, 358, 106 N.E. 127, 128 
(1914). 
164. 236 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1956). There, the plaintiff oil 
company brought an action for restitution of money paid to defen-
dant lessors as compensatory royalties in lieu of drilling a well 
on an oil and gas lease granted by the defendants. The compensa-
tory royalty agreement was executed by the plaintiff lessee under 
the false assumption that the lease agreement contained the usual 
provision requiring a lessee to either drill a well or pay a 
compensatory royalty. Because of the mistake, the court ordered 
restitution but held that equity required the deduction of any 
expenditures or expenses incurred by the [defendants] because of 
the receipt of the monies, inasmuch as they were guilty of no 
fraud or deception." Id. at 522. 
Section 69 of the Restatement of Restitution elaborates: 
"The right of a person to restitution from another because of a 
benefit received because of mistake [of fact or law] is termina-
ted or diminished if, after the receipt of the benefit, circum-
stances have so changed that it would be inequitable to require 
the other to make full restitution." 
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VI. 
THE UNIVERSITY HAD AUTHORITY TO INVEST NON-APPROPRIATED 
FUNDS IN COMMON STOCK, AND BECAUSE CATRON WAS A FIDUCIARY 
OF THE UNIVERSITY, THE BROKER-DEALERS ARE NOT LIABLE TO 
IT EVEN IF IT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO INVEST APPROPRIATED 
FUNDS IN COMMON STOCK. 
The University pooled both state appropriated and non-appropriatec 
funds to purchase the securities at issue • .l..C..5/ The University had 
clear authority to invest its non-appropriated funds in common stock, 
1 . . li§./ I f as evidenced by three Attorney Genera opinions. t o course 
follows that, if the University could purchase stocks and other 
securities, it could make commissions and interest payments incidental 
thereto. 
In addition to state appropriations, the University also receives 
money from gifts, grants, tuition payments, dormitory rental, food 
services and printing operations.ill./ Several statutes expressly 
authorize the University to convert such funds into other property 
and expressly authorize the University to invest and manage those 
165. Response to First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, 
dated April 18, 1978, R. 1938 (Bear Stearns). 
166. Exs'. B a~d ~ to the brokers' joint memorandum in opposition 
to the University s motions for partial summary judgment. R. 2005 
(Bear Stearns); Madsen Depo. at 19-20. Mr. Madsen was the Assis-
tant Attorney General assigned as counsel to the University. 
167. Sherrat Depo. at 26-28; Response to First Set of Inter-
rogatories to Plaintiff, April 18, 1978, R. 1938 (Bear Stearns). 
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funds and their proceeds.l.6..6 .. / It should therefore be clear that the 
university may invest such funds in common stock. 
This issue was squarely decided by the Indiana Supreme Court in 
f d . . . 169/ . Sendak v. Trustees o In iana University.~- The Indiana Attorney 
General there challenged the University's power to invest in common 
stock with funds received from private gifts and bequests. The court 
168. Utah Code Ann. §53-32-4 provides, in pertinent part: 
The Utah State Agricultural College [Utah State 
University of Agriculture and Applied Science] in 
its corporate capacity may take by purchase, grant, 
gift, devise or bequest any property real or per-
sonal for the use of any department of the college 
and for any purpose appropriate to the objects of 
the college. It may convert property received. by 
gift, grant, devise or bequest and not suitable 
for its uses into other property so available or 
into money. Such property so received or converted 
shall be held, invested and managed and the pro-
ceeds thereof used by the board of trustees for the 
purposes and under the conditions prescribed in the 
grant or donation. 
It must be noted that the recently enacted State Money 
Management Act, §§51-7-1 to -21 (Supp. 1977), for the first time 
places legislative restrictions on the kinds of common stock that 
properly can be purchased with funds from these sources. However, 
no such legislative restrictions existed at the date of the trans-
actions here at issue. 
Utah Code Ann. §53-48-10 (4) (1970) provides: 
The dedicated credits, such as tuitions, fees, 
federal grants, and proceeds from sales, re-
ceived by the university and colleges may be re-
tained by these institutions and used in accord-
ance with each institutional work program. 
In addition, section 53-48-20(3), authorizes the University to 
invest all funds it receives to support research. 
Each of the foregoing statutes therefore authorizes invest-
ments in common stock of non-appropriated funds. 
169. 254 Ind. 390, 260 N.E.2d 601 (1970). 
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held, under statutes considerably less expansive than the foregoing 
170/ Utah statutes,~- that the State of Indiana was not the owner of 
these non-appropriated funds, and that the University's Board of 
Trustees acted in the capacity of private trustees over such funds 
and were subject only to the limitations placed upon those gifts by 
171/ 
the donors. Therefore, the Trustees could properly invest non-
appropriated funds in common stock. 
Since the University had authority to invest at least its non-
appropriated funds in common stock, it follows as a matter of law 
that the University is barred from recovery by virtue of the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act. 1721 Mr. Catron was clearly acting as a fiduciary 
of the University when he purchased these stocks, as fiduciaries are 
defined in section 22-1-1 to include agents and officers of public or 
private corporations.173/ 
Section 22-1-5 provides that, whenever a fiduciary draws a check 
in the name of his principal and that fiduciary is empowered to write 
checks on behalf of his principal for any purpose, "the payee is not 
bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his 
170. Accordingly, this statement by the Indiana Supreme Court 
becomes even more compelling when applied to the University, with 
its considerably broader statutory power to invest in common 
stocks with private endowment funds. 
171. 260 N.E.2d at 603. 
172. §§22-1-1, et ~· Utah Code Ann. (1976). 
173. §22-1-1 defines fiduciaries to include: 
a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied, 
resulting or constructive, executer, administrator, 
guardian, conservator, curator, receiver, trustee 
in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of credit-
ors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, 
public or private, public officer, and any other 
person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any 
person, trust or estate. [emphasis added). 
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obligation as fiduciary .•• and is not chargeable with notice 
that the fiduciary is conunitting a breach of his obligation as fidu-
ciary," unless the payee has actual knowledge of that breach of duty. 174/ 
It follows, by virtue of the operation of the Utah Uniform Fidu-
ciary Act, that the broker-dealers were not put on constructive notice 
that Catron might be violating a fiduciary duty to the University when 
he had checks drawn on its behalf to pay for stocks, and since the 
broker-dealers also had no actual notice of any such breach of duty, 
they must be relieved of liability to the University. Accordingly, 
the trial court's finding that the broker-dealers are liable to the 
University should be reversed. 
VII. 
THE UNIVERSITY HAD AUTHORITY TO INVEST ANY OF ITS FUNDS 
IN COMMON STOCK AND THE TRANSACTIONS HERE AT 
ISSUE ARE NOT ULTRA VIRES. 
The University alleges that it did not have power to enter orders 
for the purchase of securities with the broker-dealers. As a matter 
of law, the University did have such power because (1) the University 
has a traditional legislative general grant of authority to handle its 
finances, including investments, and (2) the legislature specifically 
granted the University the power to invest in the securities pur-
chased. 
h h . . 175/ h T is Court, in First Equity Corp. v. Uta State University,~- as 
held that at least some of the University's funds could not be invested 
174. Id., §22-1-5 (emphasis added). 
175. 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). 
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in common stocks. We believe that this decision was erroneous and now 
urges this Court to reconsider and overrule First Equity. The grounds 
for overruling that decision are set forth in this argument, but we 
hasten to add that, even if the court does not overrule its prior 
decision in First Equity, the brokers are still entitled to judgment 
in their favor by virtue of each of the foregoing independent arguments. 
In 1888 the Territorial Assembly authorized the existence and 
operation of an agricultural college, later to become the University, 
and specified the powers of the trustees of that college, which included 
"the general control and supervision of the agricultural college, . 
of all appropriations made by the Territory for the support of the 
176; 
same." In 1892 the Territorial Assembly broadened the 
powers of the trustees by authorizing them "to exercise such other 
powers as might be incidental or necessary to carry out the express 
177/ 
powers."-
176. Agricultural College Act, §4, 1888 Utah Laws 215. 
177. This is noted in Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, 
119 Utah 104, 113, 225 P.2d 18, 23 (1950). 
The University still has authority to exercise any "other 
nec7ssary and proper ••• powers and authority not specifically 
~em.ed to the Institution." §53-48-15 (7), Utah Code Ann. This 
necessary and proper" language of course echoes Article I, §8 
of the Federal Constitution, which Chief Justice Marshall had 
occasion to interpret in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 
(181~). The discussion of that grant of power by the Chief 
Justice bears repetition here: 
Congress is authorized to pass all laws "necessary 
and proper" to carry into execution the powers con-
~erred on i~. These words "necessary and proper," 
in such an instrument, are probably to be consid-
7red as synonymous. Necessary powers must here 
intend such powers as are suitable and fitted to 
~he object; such as are the best and most useful 
in relation to the end proposed. If this be no so, 
and if Congress could use no means but such as are 
absolutely indispensible to the existence of a 
granted po~er, the government would hardly exist; 
at least, it would be wholly inadequate to the 
purposes of its formation. 
Id. at 324-25. 
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When the Utah State Constitution was enacted in 1896, it pre-
served to the University "all the rights, immunities, franchises and 
178/ 
endowments heretofore granted or conferred" to the University.---
Essentially the same powers conferred on the Board of Trustees in 1892 
were again conferred upon the University's Board of Trustees by the 
179/ 
legislature in 1919,--- and were preserved in 1969, when the legi-
slature eliminated the Board of Trustees and created a State Board of 
180/ Higher Education, which succeeded to the trustees' former powers.---
Each of these statutes from 1888 to 1969 expressly conferred authority 
on the University's governing board to have general control of the 
college and of all appropriations made by the State to the college. 
In addition to the foregoing general grants of power to the Uni-
versity to manage and invest its appropriations, the legislature has 
also given the University specific grants of authority to invest in 
securities. Section 53-32-4 gives the University full power to 
receive and re-invest personal property. Section 53-48-20(3) of the 
Higher Education Act authorize~ the University to invest all funds and 
proceeds received from research programs. 
The only statutory limitation upon which the University has ever 
based a claim that these funds are ultra vires, and upon which this 
Court based its ruling in First Equity, is Section 33-1-1, which 
simply supplements powers of public bodies and others to invest in 
Similarly, if the University had authority only to exercise 
specifically delegated powers, it too could hardly exist. This 
grant of necessary and proper authority to the University in con-
junction with its broad general grant of authority to invest real 
and personal property must be construed to empower the University 
to purchase and sell common stocks, since there was, at the time 
of these investments, no express statutory restriction on that 
power. 
178. Article X, Sec. 4, Utah Constitution. 
179. Utah State Agricultural College Act, §15, 1919 Utah Laws 45. 
180. Utah Code Ann. §53-48-4 (1970). 
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securities. The act states on its face at section 33-1-3, that its 
provisions are "supplemental to any and all other laws relating to and 
declaring what shall be legal investment for the . . . organizations 
• referred to in this Act." 
Given both the general and specific statutory grants of authority 
to the University to invest funds it receives, and the fact that the 
University is not restricted to the securities identified in section 
33-1-1 this Court should conclude that the University had power to 
invest in the securities at issue here, and should therefore reverse 
the trial court's finding that the broker-dealers are liable to the 
University. 
VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE BROKER-
DEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM. 
In addition to the foregoing erroneous rulings by the trial 
court, it also erred when it denied all broker-dealers' Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The broker-dealers 
respectfully request that this Court reverse those rulings. 
As noted in the preliminary factual discussion in this brief,1811 
the broker-dealers filed two Rule 12(b) (6) motions during the course 
of proceedings below. The first motion was denied before the broker· 
dealers filed their counterclaims and cross-claims, 182 1 and their 
second 12(b) (6) motion was denied at the time the court granted the 
University's motion for partial swrunary judgment.183/ ' 
181. See text supra nn. 86 and 99. 
182. Order cited supra n. 88. 
183. Order cited supra n. 101. 
-58-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
When the broker-dealers filed their first motion to dismiss they 
had not yet had occasion to undertake any formal discovery, but they 
did present the court with the following uncontroverted facts, ascer-
tained through informal discovery and information in their own 
business records: 
1. The University opened its accounts with each broker-dealer 
with the full knowledge and express prior written authority of its 
principal officers and the Institutional Council (i.e., the written 
resolutions, one of which is attached to the broker-dealers' memo-
randum as Exhibit B). 184/ 
2. The University heirarchy never advised the broker-dealers 
that it might lack power to purchase common stock. 
These facts are essentially the same as those developed during 
discovery, which merely supplemented these basic points and demon-
strated the remarkable degree to which each of these transactions was 
monitored by the Council. When the broker-dealers' second motion to 
dismiss was denied by the court, it of course had before it all the 
facts set forth in this brief, as each of them was argued in the 
broker-dealers' joint memorandum opposing the University's partial 
Snmm • d • 185/ ~ .... ary JU gment motion.~-
184. This statement of facts presented to the court is greatly 
summarized in this text. Many of the facts subsequently further 
developed during the course of discovery were also initially 
raised in support of the brokers' original motions to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. 
185. All those facts are set forth at length in the statement 
of facts in the brokers' joint memorandum in oppostiion to the 
University's motions for partial summary judgment, dated May 15, 
1978, at 4-22. R. 2005 (Bear Stearns). 
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In support of both of their motions to dismiss the broker-dealers 
raised a number of grounds for dismissal which they also raised as 
affirmative defenses to the University's complaints, and which they 
therefore also r~ised as grounds for opposing summary judgment in 
favor of the University. Because those arguments and defenses are 
discussed in detail in preceding arguments they need not be reiter-
ated here. 
The arguments the broker-dealers raised to support their motions 
to dismiss were: 
l. The University should be estopped to recover here (Argu-
ment I, supra). 
2. The University may not recover on executed illegal con-
tracts (Argument II, supra). 
3. Allowing the University to recover would deny the broker-
dealers due process and equal protection of law (Argument III, supra). 
4. The University had authority to invest non-appropriated 
funds in common stock, and because Catron was a fiduciary of the 
University, the broker-dealers may not be held liable to it (Argu-
ment VI, supra) . 
5. The University had power to invest all its funds in common 
stock and these transactions were not ultra vires (Argument VII, 
supra) . 
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Each of the foregoing grounds should have been independently 
sufficient to result in judgment for the broker-dealers on their 
motions to dismiss. They therefore request that this Court reverse 
the trial court's rulings on those motions and direct it to enter 
judgment in their favor. Even if the Court refuses to direct entry 
of judgment in their favor on those 12(b) (6) motions they respect-
fully request that it reverse the order allowing partial summary 
judgment to the University and allow them to raise and prove each of 
those defenses in further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION TO PART ONE 
On each of the foregoing independent grounds, the broker-dealers 
submit that the trial court erred in granting the University partial 
summary judgment and in denying the broker-dealers' motions to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim. Both of those rulings should be 
reversed and judgment should accordingly be entered in favor of the 
broker-dealers. 
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PART TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
BROKER-DEALERS' THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS AND COUNTERCLAIMS. 
INTRODUCTION 
'!he foregoing arguments demonstrate that the University should 
not be entitled to recover any sums from the broker-dealers. If the 
Court rules, as the broker-dealers have requested, that they cannot be 
liable to the University under any of those theories, then it might 
appear that there is no need to consider the question of reversing the 
trial court's entry of final judgment in favor of the third-party 
defendants and the University on the broker-dealers' third-party 
complaints and counterclaims. 
In fact, however, even if this Court does reverse the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling, the broker-dealers should be entitled 
to proceed on their third-party actions and counterclaim anyway, as 
they seek indemnity and contribution against University officers and 
Institutional Council members, not only for any damages eventually 
awarded to the University in its complaint against the broker-dealers,: 
but also for costs and attorneys' fees expended by the broker-dealers 
in defending the University's actions.lJl...2./ 
The broker-dealers also request that this Court order the counter· 
claims and third-party actions to be reinstated if it does not reverse 
the trial court's partial summary judgment ruling. 
The broker-dealers' claims for indemnity or contribution are 
based upon theories of implied contract, warranty, implied warranty, 
misrepresentation, and conduct outside the scope of authority. The 
186. McCormick on Damages, §66 at 246, §67 at 247-48, §68 at 250, 252. 
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gravamen of all of those theories is that, when an agent is held 
liable to a third person in circumstances where he is innocent and his 
principal directed him to conunit the acts upon which recovery is based 
by the third party, then the principal must reimburse his agent for 
all amounts expended by the agent in defending the claims of the third 
party. The court below granted the third-party defendants' motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim,187 1 which of course presupposes 
that under no conceivable state of facts could those persons who 
actively implemented and supervised the University's investment pro-
gram be held liable to the broker-dealers. 
The broker-dealers wish to point out once again that they had no 
opportunity to conduct any discovery against any of the third-party 
defendants before the trial court dismissed the third-party actions 
and counterclaims. Therefore, in ruling on those parties' motions to 
dismiss the broker-dealers' claims for contribution and indemnity, the 
court was obliged to regard as true all allegations in the broker-
dealers' pleading.i.aa../ The facts pled by the broker-dealers in those 
actions were: 
1. The third-party defendants directed and authorized the Uni-
versity's investments in the subject securities. 
2. In connection with those investments, the third-party def-
endants represented in writing by formal corporate resolution to the 
broker-dealers that the University had capacity to purchase stock, 
that Catron had authority to order securities for the University, and 
187. The order granting those motions is discussed supra n. 95 
and in accompanying text. 
188. ~· Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 
382 U.S. 172 (1965) (interpreting the identical federal rule 12). 
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that the resolution would remain in full force and effect until revoke: 
in writing. 
3. The broker-dealers believed that the University had capacity 
to purchase securities and they did not receive notice that the Uniw~ 
sity lacked such power or that Catron's authority had been revoked 
until after all of the subject securities transactions had been com-
pleted. 
4. The broker-dealers acted as intermediaries or agents in 
nearly all these transactions and were not sellers of the securities 
at issue. 
5. The third-party defendan-ts were negligent or grossly negli· 
gent in failing to determine that these securities purchases might be 
ultra vires, while the broker-dealers were purely innocent agents. Ir. 
the alternative, if the broker-dealers are charged with constructive 
knowledge that these purchases were ultra vires, then the third-party 
defendants are also so charged. 
6. The third-party defendants exceeded their statutory autho-
rity in approving these investments. 
If the foregoing facts are deemed to be true, the trial court's 
dismissal of the third-party actions and counterclaims should be 
reversed. 
I. 
THE BROKER-DEALERS' CLAIMS FOR INDEMNITY AND 
CONTRIBUTION STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THOSE CLAIMS. 
The third-party actions instituted by the broker-dealers against 
Institutional Council members and University officers were predicated, 
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not on the stock transactions themselves upon which the University 
herein seeks recovery, but instead on the express warranties of capacity 
and authority which were directed to each of them by the Council. 
Accordingly, the broker-dealers' third-party actions do not suffer 
from the legal defects in the University's complaints: the broker-
dealers do not seek recovery on ultra vires contracts, but instead on 
express misrepresentations and warranties. Under well-settled prin-
ciples of law, those express warranties of capacity and authority give 
rise to an implied contract to indemnify the broker-dealers from any 
losses they may suffer as a result of their reasonable reliance on 
those warranties. 
If the broker-dealers are even constructively at fault in these 
cases (i.e., if they are charged with constructive notice of the 
illegality of these investments despite the foregoing arguments that 
they cannot be so chargedJ,189 / then they are entitled to full indemnity 
for all losses they ultimately sustain as a result of reliance on 
representations by the Council. On the other hand, if the court below 
were to determine, following trial, that the broker-dealers were 
equally culpable with the Council members and University officers, 
then at least their claims for some contribution from those indivi-
duals state a cause of action under the general principles applicable 
to joint wrongdoers. 190 1 
189. See nn. 120 through 125 supra and accompanying text. 
190. Joint wrongdoers are liable for contribution in any case 
where they are both culpable. ~· 18 Arn. Jur. 2d Contributions 
§§1, 8. 
Contribution was allowed by this court in numerous cases 
where the wrongful act of the defendant seeking contribution was 
not intentional or negligent. In Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 
44 P. 833 (1896), the Court held that anyone who has conunitted a 
tort which is one "arising from construction or inference of law, 
and not arising from unknown or meditated wrong ... may then 
have contribution." Id. at 141, 44 P. at 836. 
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A. The Broker-Dealers' Indemnity Claims Stated A Cause of Act~. 
Turning first to the broker-dealers' claims for indemnity, the 
assurances of the Council to the broker-dealers constitute express 
warranties of capacity and authority for which they are strictly 
liable to the broker~dealers if those warranties prove false. This is 
so because the whole purpose of warranty is to relieve the one so 
assured of his duty to inquire into the facts for . 191/ himself.--
Even should the broker-dealers be liable to the University and 
charged with constructive notice of the limits of its capacity and 
authority despite their diligent inquiries into those issues, and 
192/ despite the Council's warranties to them,~- the law is replete with 
statements that one only constructively liable may recover indemnity 
from another party who is actually or primarily at fault. For example, 
one author states that "In the area of non-contractual indemnity the 
right rests upon the fault of another which has been imputed or 
And in Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P. 512 (1903), the 
Court found that the actions of the plaintiff seeking contribu-
tion had been innocent in purpose, and therefore the cause of 
action had been properly stated. There plaintiff acted in good 
faith on the representation of defendant that he could take 
possession of certain chattels upon which defendant had a chattel 
mortgage. In taking possession he was not aware that his actions 
constituted the tort of conversion. The court reiterated the 
principle that, where the person held liable was acting in good 
faith and without knowing that he was infringing on the legal 
rights of third persons, he is entitled to contribution. Id. at 
449, 73 P. at 514. 
191. ~, Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 
(2d Cir. 1946) (warranty is assurance of material fact upon which 
prornisee is entitled to rely, is intended to relieve promisee of 
duty of inquiry, and amounts to promise to indemnify promisee for 
any loss if warranty is proved untrue.) 
192. That the brokers should be relieved of the burden of con-
structive notice in these cases is explained at length, supra at 
nn. 120-125. 
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. 1 f d h' . . .193/ constructive y astene upon im who seeks indemnity. ~- To the 
same effe~t is the statement that a person 
is entitled to recover indemnity where, as between 
the parties to the indemnity action, the defendant 
is primarily liable while the plaintiff is only 
secondarily liable -- that is, when the plaintiff 
is only technically or constructively liable to the 
injured party, or where his liability was based on 
a legal or contractual relationship with the def-
endant. 194 I 
Numerous holdings reaffirm the principle that a master held 
liable because of respondeat superior (another legal fiction, analo-
gous to constructive notice) may recover indemnity from the servant 
who actually caused an injury, which is simply the other side of the 
ill,_·/ 
coin from the basis for indemnity asserted by the brokers here. ' 
B. The Broker-Dealers' Indemnity Claims Based on Warranty 
Stated A Cause of Action. 
A warranty is any assurance by one party of the existence of a 
material fact upon which a second party may rely. Its express purpose 
is to relieve the second party of his duty to inquire further into the 
facts for himself. A party who relies on an express warranty is 
entitled to be indemnified for any loss he sustains because of the 
193. 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, §19 (emphasis added). 
194. Id., §20 at 707-08 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
Accord:-- Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 
81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130, 146 (1932). Leflar points out that the 
right of indemnity may arise through contract, quasi-contract, or 
tort, and notes that "the obligation to indemnify is not a con-
sensual one; it is based altogether upon the laws notion 
influenced by an equitable background -- of what is fair and proper 
between the parties." 
195. ~· Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 109, 
112, 493 P. 2d 625 (1972). 
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warranty's falsity.12..§_/ 
In these cases of course the broker-dealers cannot be held liab~ 
to the University at all if they are relieved of constructive notice, 
as that is the sole basis for the University's theory of recovery. 
Furthermore, these express warranties to the broker-dealers should not 
only relieve them of any such constructive notice and should therefore 
result in judgment in their favor on the University's complaint, those 
warranties should for the same reason entitle them to recover on these 
third-party actions. 
C. The Broker-Dealers' Claims For Contribution Stated A Cause 
of Action. 
The principles applicable to a claim for indemnity where one is 
only constructively liable apply with equal force to a claim for con· 
tribution. A series of Utah cases has held that one only construct-
ively liable to an injured party may recover either contribution or 
indemnity from the person primarily responsible.~/ 
D. The Court Below Erred in Shifting All Liability On These 
Transactions to the Broker-Dealers. 
The court granted all the d1ird-party defendants' motions to 
dismiss without setting forth any reasons for those dismissals in 
196. ~· Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 162 (Ct. Cl. 
1968). See Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 
301 (Utah 1975). 
197. Cases cited supra, n. 190. And see Holmstead v. Abbott GM 
Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 109, 112, 493 P.2d 625 (1972) ("While a 
master may be jointly sued with the servant for a tort of the 
latter, ... they are not joint tort-feasors in the sense that 
they are equal wrongdoers without right of contribution, for the 
master may recover from the servant the amount of loss caused him 
by the tort ..•. "). 
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d d . . 198/ h 1 1 its memoran um ecision.-- T e on y c ues provided by the court 
at later dates as to its reasons for dismissing the counterclaims 
and third-party actions were two statements it made in the course of 
other rulings. At oral arguments on April 19, 1978, the court ex-
plained that its decision to grant the third-party motions filed by 
the officers and Council members was based "primarily on immunity."~ 
And the court also noted, in its final decision granting the Univer-
sity's motions for partial summary judgment, that:200/ 
This court feels that the brokers cannot escape lia-
bility for their illegal acts, acts with which they 
are charged legally with knowing to be illegal by 
saying officials of Utah State also knew this and 
were charged with this knowledge. The Court feels 
that where a governmental entity is involved and the 
parties are charged with the legal use of public 
funds that the other illegal party cannot escape 
liability by saying the specific party he dealt 
with does not come into this matter with clean 
hands either. 
In other words, if one "illegal party" is a government entity or 
official, and the other "illegal party" is a private party, the trial 
court believes that only the private party may be held responsible 
for losses occasioned by the conduct of the government or its offi-
cial. Also clear in the court's statement is its belief that ordi-
nary defenses to an equitable action for restitution are not available 
to defendants when they are sued by the government. The broker-dealers 
respectfully submit that this principle of law is untenable, grossly 
unfair, and completely without legal foundation. Accordingly, the 
third-party actions should be re-instituted. 
198. R. 1775 (Bear Stearns). 
199. April 19, 1978 Tr. at 68 (Vol. 237). 
200. October 27, 1978 memorandum decision, R. 2186. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRD PARTY 
ACTIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT THOSE DISMISSALS 
WERE BASED ON GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
As just noted,201/ the court stated during the course of oral 
arguments on April 19, 1978, that its "primary" ground for dismissing 
the third-party complaints was that of immunity. The court erred in 
holding that the Council members and officers were immune in these 
third-party proceedings, for a variety of reasons. 
The Council members and officers did not claim immunity under the 
Governmental Immunity Act, since that Act applies only to "governmental 
entities" and does not apply to employees of "governmental entities."!! 
Instead, they merely argued that they were entitled to a common law 
"official immunity" for their conduct of official, discretionary 
. 203/ duties.~- The third-party defendants' recognition that they could 
not invoke the protection of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was 
. 204/ 
quite correct,~- but their assertion of common law immunity was not 
well taken, and the trial court erred in ruling in their favor on that 
basis. 
A. Officials !-lay Not Invoke Immunity If They Exceed Their 
Authority. 
A decision issued by this Court during the course of the proceed· 
201. See text at supra n. 199. 
202 •. ~· Nov. 21, 1977 Tr. at 87-88 (Vol. 38) (remarks of Mr. 
Campbell) . 
203. Id. 
204. ~, Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah 1977) 
("The Utah Government Immunity Act applies only to entities and 
does not include individual [employees] .") · 
-70-
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ings in these cases, and argued to the court below at oral arguments 
on the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss,205 1 clearly demon-
strates the trial court's error in dismissing the claims against the 
officers and Council members. In Cornwall v. Larsen,20 6 / a minor 
was injured in a collision between the automobile in which he was 
riding and a vehicle operated by a deputy sheriff. He brought suit 
against the county, the deputy sheriff and the sheriff. The trial 
court dismissed the suit as to all defendants, but this Court reversed 
the dismissal as against the sheriff and other named individuals, and 
remanded the case for tria1.207 / The Court ruled that the allegations 
of the complaint stated a cause of action becuase they alleged that 
the acts of the officer driving the emergency vehicle were willful, 
f 1 d . f . . 208/ unlaw u , an in excess o his authority.- In an earlier decision, 
this Court ruled that an officer engaged in the ,exercise of a govern-
mental function was not protected from liability if he was acting in 
. 209; bad faith or outside the scope of his authority.~-
The allegations of the complaints filed by the broker-dealers 
clearly meet the requirements for stating a cause of action against 
individual government officers as set forth in Cornwall and earlier 
205. Arguments of Mr. Christensen on behalf of Bosworth Sullivan, 
Nov. 21, 1977 tr. at 62-64 (Vol. 38). 
206. 571 P. 2d 925 (Utah 1977). 
207. Id. at 928. 
208. Id. at 927. 
209. Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 316-17, 445 P.2d 367 
(1968) . 
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Utah cases.210/ The broker-dealers have alleged that the conduct of 
the officers exceeded the scope of their authority, allege that those 
officers were negligent in not ascertaining that the securities trans· 
actions in question might be ultra vires, and allege that the officers 
knew or should have known these facts. The brokers also state a cause 
of action against the officers and members for failing to notify them 
earlier of their revocation of Catron's authority, a purely mini-
211/ 
sterial act which would also give rise to liability.~-
Whenever a public officer exceeds his authority or jurisdiction 
in carrying out either ministerial or discretionary duties in this 
state, he will be held personally liable to the private party injured 
by his actions, if his actions are in excess of his statutory autho-
rity.212 / It is clear that the third-party complaints stated claims 
against the members and officers for acts outside their statutory 
authority. 
210. Any time an officer acts outside the scope of his authority, 
he will be liable to anyone he injures. Logan City v. Allen, 86 
Utah 375, 381, 44 P.2d 1085 (1935) (officers performing discre-
tionary acts "may become civilly liable where they act in excess 
of authority"); Blomquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 
P.2d 430 (1971) (if county officials were mistaken with respect 
to jurisdictional facts upon which they acted, then they would be 
personally liable to plaintiffs); Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 
527, 57 P.2d 1128 (1936) (no public officer may claim immunity 
for the commission of an act entirely outside the scope of his 
official duties."). 
211. It is undisputed by the third-party defendants that public 
employees are liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts. 
212. Cases cited supra n. 210. 
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This is best represented by a simple syllogism: (1) if the 
University is entitled to recover in its principal action against the 
broker-dealers, it will do so on the sole basis that the securities 
transactions at issue were ultra vires, i.e., not authorized by 
statute; (2) if the University lacks statutory capacity to engage in 
the subject transactions, then the members and officers similarly 
lacked statutory authority to order the securities at issue or to 
issue the resolutions and ratifications of those transactions upon 
which the broker-dealers relied in taking the University's orders; (3) 
accordingly, the acts of the officers and members are not protected by 
conunon law official immunity, because they clearly exceeded their 
statutory authority as alleged in the complaints. 
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PART THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING MERRILL LYNCH'S MOTION 
FOR CHANGE OF VENUE AND THE OTHER BROKER-DEALERS' 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF IN PERSONAM 
JURISDICTION 
I. 
MERRILL LYNCH'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE 
TO THE THIRD DISTRICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
There is no dispute that the venue of this action is governed 
by Utah Code Ann. §78-13-7 (1953), which requires that an action be 
tried in the county where either (1) the action arises or (2) the 
defendant resides. The University did not challenge the fact that 
Merrill Lynch resides in Salt Lake County for venue purposes. Since 
defendant's residence is not at issue, the question here turns on 
whether the cause of action arose in Salt Lake County or in Cache 
County. 
The lower court erroneously held that the cause of action arose 
in Cache County. In its memorandum decision, the court erroneously 
found that the University's Cache Ccunty bank was "designated" by 
Merrill Lynch to be its agent to accept securities on the University's 
behalf and to pay Merrill Lynch. The court erroneously reasoned that 
the "wrong" was the payment for the securities by the University in 
Logan and because payment was made by a Cache County bank acting as 
"agent" for Merrill Lynch, the cause of action arose there. 
The uncontroverted facts are that the University opened and 
maintained an account with Merrill Lynch at its Salt Lake City offi~ 1 
that Merrill Lynch has not had an office or representative in Cache 
County, Utah, that it received and forwarded all orders from the 
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university for the purchase and sale of securities at its Salt Lake 
office, that Catron placed approximately half of the University's 
orders while he was in Merrill Lynch's office in Salt Lake City, that 
the University, not Merrill Lynch, designated its bank in Logan, Utah 
to accept securities ordered by the University and to pay Merrill 
Lynch for the same, that Merrill Lynch never maintained an account 
with the University's bank in Cache County, that Merrill Lynch had 
no control over the University's bank, and that because the Univer-
sity's bank was continually late in making payment for securities 
delivered, Merrill Lynch ceased doing business with the University~~2/ 
A. The Cause of Action Arose in Salt Lake County. 
1. The Cause of Action Arises Where the Defendant's 
Wrongful Act Occurs. Any Wrongful Acts Allegedly Committed By Merrill 
Lynch Must Have Occurred in Salt Lake County. 
214/ The cause of action occurs where the wrong occurs.- If "the 
two essential factors of the cause of action, namely, the right of 
the plaintiff and the act or omission on the part of the defendant, 
occur in different counties, the cause of action accrues in the 
county in which defendant's wrongful act was done. 11 215/ 
What the University actually bases its venue claims on are its 
own contacts with a bank in Cache County, not those of Merrill Lynch. 
213. Memorandum and Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Change of Venue and accompanying Affidavits. R. 21, 28, 30, 31, 
85, 95, 97 (Merrill Lynch). 
214. Bach v. Brown, 17 Utah 435, 439, 53 P. 991 (1898) ("the 
cause of action ... is the wrong"). 
215. 92 C.J.S. Venue, §80 at 776-77 and n. 96, citing several 
authorities. Accord: State v. Lake Tavery, 252 P.2d 831 (Idaho 
1953); Bergin v. Temple, 111 P.2d 286 (Mont. 1941). 
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The plaintiff's own contacts with the forum are, however, irrelevant 
for purposes of a motion for change of venue. In an analogous case, 
American Body & Trailer Co. v. Higgins71:2./ a plaintiff brought an 
action against a corporation for breach of contract for sale of goods. 
In determining where the cause of action "arose," the court found 
that, where the plaintiff contracted to purchase goods in one county, 
and the corporation assented to the contract in another county, venue 
was proper only in the second county. 
In the instant case, Merrill Lynch assented to the transactions 
in question from its place of business in Salt Lake County, and all 
other actions taken by it in this state on the University's behalf 
occurred there. Venue is proper only in Salt Lake County because 
that is only where the wrong alleged against Merrill Lynch could 
have taken place. 
2. The Logan Bank Was Not an Agent of Merrill Lynch. 
The court below found that Merrill Lynch "designated"217/the 
bank in Logan to receive the securities on the University's behalf, 
although the University had not disputed Merrill Lynch's assertion 
that the University, not Merrill Lynch, had chosen that bank. The 
court therefore concluded that the cause of action arose in Cache 
County. The University argued below that the acceptance of the Uni-
versi ty' s money is the "wrong" upon which the complaint is based, not 
Merrill Lynch's acceptance and execution of the University's orders, 
and the wrong occurred in Logan because the bank there was Merrill 
Lynch's agent. 
216. 156 P.2d 1005 (Okla. 1945). 
217. R. 151 (Bosworth Sullivan file). The Merrill Lynch file 
does not contain a copy of that decision; it notes that this 
memorandum decision is contained only in the Bosworth file. R. 
128 (Merrill Lynch file). 
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This position is based on the tenuous argument that the Utah 
uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-201(1), not intended to 
resolve venue questions, may be so construed as to make the Logan 
bank the agent of Merrill Lynch. The University argued that because 
Merrill Lynch accompanied the securities sent to the Logan bank with a 
sight draft to draw on the University's account for payment and because 
the bank was a "collecting bank" and not a "payor bank" within the 
meaning of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was Merrill 
Lynch's agent. Although these provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code are inapplicable to questions of venue, it is clear that the 
Logan bank was a "payor bank", not a "collecting bank" and thus not 
the agent of Merrill Lynch. This is made clear by the applicable 
provisions of the Code. 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-105(b) states that a "payor bank" is a 
"bank by which an item [here, a sight draft) is payable as drawn or 
accepted." Official Comment (2) to the Uniform Commercial Code, as 
adopted by the American Law Institute, states that: 
The term "payor bank" includes ... a bank at 
which an item is payable if the item constitutes 
an order of the bank to pay, for it is then 
"payable by" the bank. 
Section 70A-4-105(d) provides: 
"Collecting bank" means any bank handling the 
item for collection except the payor bank. 
Clearly the Logan bank was the payor bank on the item. Because 
the Logan bank was the payor bank, it was not Merrill Lynch's agent 
under §70A-4-201(1). The action did not arise in Cache County. It 
arose in Salt Lake County, and the court below erred in denying Merrill 
Lynch's motion for change of venue. 
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3. A Defendant's Right to be Sued in the County of His 
Residence is Not Lightly to be Denied. 
The privilege conferred on a defendant of being sued 
in the county of his domicile is a valuable and sub-
stantial right, which is not to be denied except in 
strict compliance with the law, as where the case 
against defendant clearly comes within one of the 
statutory exceptions to his right to be sued in the 
county where he resides.218/ 
Statutes permitting suit in some place other than the defendant's 
domicile are in derogation of this common law right and must be con-
strued strictly~l 9/ But even if it is assumed arguendo that some 
facet of the cause of action here arose in Cache County, venue is 
still properly laid in Salt Lake County. 
[I]t has been said that it would lead to confu-
sion and the practice of "forum shopping" if the 
law were to permit a suit to be commenced against 
a corporation in any county where any facet of a 
complex transaction occurred.220/ 
Merrill Lynch is entitled to defend this action in the county where 
it resides. The court below erred in denying its motion for change 
of venue. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE MOTIONS OF 
BEAR STEARNS, HORNBLOWER AND SUTRO TO DISMISS 
FOR LACK OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION. 
The lower court erroneously held Bear Stearns, Hornblower and 
Sutro were subject to in personarn jurisdiction in this state even 
though the University opened accounts with them in California, sent 
its agent there to meet personally with them on several occasions 
218. 92 C.J.S. Venue, §82 at 780-81 (citations emitted, emphasis 
added) . ~~-
219. Id., §82 at 781 (and authorities cited therein). 
220. 77 Arn. Jur. 2d Venue, §38 at 884 (citations omitted). 
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and even though no employee or agent of these broker-dealers ever 
met with any representative of the University in this state. 2211 The 
court so held because (1) these broker-dealers advertised in period-
icals published outside of Utah but with national circulation and 
(2) they mailed securities, confirmation slips, and monthly state-
ments to the University in Logan. 222 / Decisions of the Utah Supreme 
court interpreting Utah's long-arm statute demonstrate that Utah does 
not have personal jurisdiction over these defendants. 
In 1969 the Utah legislature adopted §78-27-24, Utah Code Ann., 
Utah's long-arm statute. Pursuant to this statute, a person submits 
himself to the jurisdiction of this state 
As to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this 
state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state, 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty. 
While the long-arm statute also sets forth other bases for jurisdic-
tion, the University has alleged jurisdiction over these defendants 
223; 
pursuant to the foregoing provisions only.~-
A. The Defendants Are Not Subject to In Personarn Jurisdiction 
in the State of Utah Because They Have Not Engaged in Substantial 
Activities Within the State. 
221. Memoranda and accompanying Affidavits supporting motions to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. R. 45, 57, 59, 61 
(Bear Stearns); R. 23, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44 (Sutro); R. 23, 36, 38 
(Hornblower) . 
222. Memorandum Decision filed Jan. 18, 1977 at 2. R. 293 (Bear 
Stearns) . 
223. University memoranda opposing motions to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction. R. 129, 265 (Bear Stearns). 
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224/ 
In Producers Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller,~- this Court held 
that the activities performed by a Utah resident on behalf of the 
nonresident defendants constituted substantial activities within the 
state. Therefore, the defendants were subject to the jurisdiction of 
Utah courts under the long-arm statute. In his opinion holding that 
jurisdiction existed, Justice Crockett acknowledged that there are 
necessary and desirable limitations to the extension of jurisdiction 
over nonresident defendants: 22 5/ 
[I]n order to assert jurisdiction over a party, it 
must appear that he engaged in some substantial 
activities within the state beyond ... merely 
transitory matters •.• , so that it is reasonable 
and just to assume that he has had the benefit of 
the protections and advantages of the laws and 
institutions of the state to the extent that it 
is within the concept of fairness and due process 
that he be subjected to the jurisdiction of its 
court. 
In Producers Livestock, the nonresident defendants operated a live-
stock operation outside Utah and hired a Utah resident to act as 
manager. At all times the livestock was expressly designated as 
belonging to the nonresident defendants. The resident carried on the 
business in Utah for the defendants , had an office here, and obtained 
a loan here to finance the livestock operation. The Court found that 
the resident was an agent of the nonresident defendants. Therefore, 
insofar as the Utah resident was doing acts within the scope of his 
authority in Utah, the defendants were deemed to be performing those 
acts themselves. 226/ 
In contrast, the defendants in this case had no person or agent 
transacting any business in Utah for them. Moreover, the activities 
224. 580 P.2d 603 (Utah 1978). 
225. Id. at 605. 
226. Id. at 606. 
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conducted by the defendants in Utah are much less substantial than 
those engaged in by the New York defendants through their representa-
tive in Producers Livestock. The broker-dealers' activities (mailing 
documents) in Utah were merely incidental to the securities trans-
actions which took place in California. The University voluntarily 
decided to conduct its stock purchasing business in California rather 
than in Utah. It opened and maintained accounts with defendants at 
their respective offices in California. The University's investment 
officer placed orders for securities purchases which were accepted by 
defendants in California and executed on the University's behalf on 
national exchanges outside of Utah. Payment for these securities 
occurred outside of Utah. 
The activi~ies of these broker-dealers found to be significant 
by the court below are comparable to some of the transitory matters 
acknowledged by Justice Crockett in Producers Livestock to be out-
side the jurisdictional powers of· Utah courts: 22 71 
(1) Where a person buys stock in a corporation, 
such as U.S. Steel or General Motors, where 
the enterprise is located in and carried on 
in another state; or 
(2) Where a manufacturer advertises and distri-
butes his product for sale through independent 
dealers or retailers in other states. 
In such instances, it is very likely there will be incidental activi-
ties involving the exchange of money from a bank in one forum to 
another, or various mailings between the parties such as the confir-
mation slips and account statements in this case. These insignifi-
cant activities incidental to such matters would no~ serve to bring 
227, Id. at 605. 
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the transaction within the jurisdictional power of this state. The 
University's actions against these defendants should be dismissed for 
lack of in personarn jurisdiction. 
B. The Defendants Have Not Transacted Business in Utah. 
This Court set forth in Hill v. Zale Corp., 2281 - a decision 
cited favorably in Producers Livestock -- a number of factors to be 
considered collectively to determine if a corporate defendant was 
"doing business" and thus established the minimum contacts necessary 
to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction: 
(1) Whether there are local offices, stores or 
outlets; 
(2) The presence of personnel, how hired, fired 
and paid; 
(3) The manner of holding out to the public by way 
of advertising, telephone listing, catalogues, 
etc.; 
(4) The presence of its property, real and per-
sonal, or interest therein, including inven-
tories, bank accounts, etc.; 
(5) Whether the activities are sporadic or transi-
tory as compared to continuous and systematic; 
(6) The extent to which the alleged facts of the 
asserted claim arose from activities within 
the State; 
(7) The relative hardship or convenience to the 
parties in being required to litigate the con-
troversy in the State or elsewhere. 
Under these considerations, and after analysis of the facts in the 
cases decided by this Court, it is clear that these defendants were 
not doing business in the State of Utah. 
In U . 0 Sk. c u . ·p1 . 229 I h' . ni n i o. v. nion astics Corp.~- -- a case w icn 
more closely reserrililes the factual setting of this case -- the Cour: 
228. 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332 (1971). 
229. 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976). 
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held that Utah courts did not have in personarn jurisdiction over a 
California company that had contacts in Utah much more substantial 
than those of the defendants here. The defendant company in that case 
had no office or store in the state, no property, inventory, telephone 
listing or bank account, and did no advertising in Utah. In addition, 
the contract at issue was executed in California, payments were made 
to the defendant's bank in California, and the ski boots were to be 
manufactured there. The contacts which the defendant did have with 
Utah did not amount to conduct or activity beyond a mere casual or 
. 230/ 
transitory presence.~-
In Foreign Study League v. Holland-American Line, 231 / the Court 
upheld the jurisdiction of the Utah courts, but only after observing 
that defendant's representatives had on several occasions traveled to 
the State of Utah to conduct business with the President of the plain-
tiff corporation. Also, the defendant corporation had authorized 
nUI:lerous agents within the state' to display defendant's literature, to 
"sell bookings" for defendant's ships, and to accept commissions for 
accepted bookings. Finally, defendant entered into agreements exer-
cising substantial control over the activities of its agents here. 
Again, in contrast, the defendants in this case have not traveled to 
Utah to conduct business and have never maintained any agents or 
employees in the State. 
C. The Defendants' Activities in This State Do Not Constitute 
The Minimum Contacts Sufficient to Permit Assertion of Jurisdiction by 
Utah Over These Defendants. 
230. Id. at 1259. 
231. 27 Utah 2d 442, 497 P.2d 244 (1972). 
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As stated by the United States Supreme Court: 232 1 
Due process requires only that in order to subject 
the defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be 
not present wit~in the territory o~ the forum, he 
has certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 
It is apparent that the activities of defendants do not rise to 
a level which would satisfy the due process clause. All of the busi-
ness transactions that took place between these parties took place in 
California or by telephonic communications. Defendants have never 
maintained offices, telephones, telephone listings, office equipment, 
employees, agents, books, bank accounts, records or the like, or 
advertised in Utah. 
The defendants' advertising in national publications does not 
constitute contacts which rise to the level of fair play. The Utah 
legislature has recognized that it would be unfair and unreasonable 
to require foreign broker-dealers to register in Utah simply because 
they advertise in national publications which are read in Utah. See 
Utah Blue Sky Law, Utah Code Ann. §61-1-26(4). Similarly, the con-
firmation slips and account statements mailed by the defendants to the 
University are merely contacts incidental to a transaction that occur-
red in California. These documents served only to provide a record 
after the fact of the activity authorized by the University in its 
accounts in California -- they were not the activity. The stock 
certificates sent to Utah were of a nature similar to that of the 
confirmation slips and account statements; thus that contact does not 
rise to a level which satisfies the due process clause. 
232. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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Finally, it would offend traditional notions of fair play to 
assert jurisdiction over the defendants on the basis of the telephone 
calls received by them from the University. This Court has expressly 
held that nwnerous telephone calls into the State, occurring over a 
fifteen year period, will not sustain personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant. In Cate Rental Co., Inc. v. Whalen & Co.;~ 
jurisdiction was lacking even though "defendant called plaintiff by 
telephone . . . on the average of five times a year for the past ten 
years," in order to arrange for leasing plaintiff's equipment. More-
over, it must be remembered that those telephone calls were made to 
effectuate business in California, and not in Utah as has already been 
explained. 
In summary, these three defendants were not properly subjected 
to personal jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute, and the 
University's complaints against them should be dismissed. 
233. 549 P. 2d 707 (Utah 1976) · 
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CONCLUSION 
No party to any of these actions has alleged or could allege that 
these defendant broker-dealers did anything during the period from 
September 1970 through March 1973 other than to scrupulously, fairly, 
and diligently carry out instructions given to them by the governing 
body of the University. That same group of officials initiated and 
defined the governing policies of the University's investment program, 
approved every purchase and sale at issue here, had actual knowledge 
of the transactions executed for the University, and affixed the 
University's corporate seal to their representations of capacity and 
authority to each broker-dealer. Now the University seeks to recover 
all the funds which those individuals allegedly misspent, from def-
endants who were not even parties to the underlying transactions. 
Allowing recovery to the University under those circumstances and 
denying the broker-dealers their right to indemnity and contribution 
would be not merely incomprehensible but would also defy due process 
of the law and would serve no legitimate public policy. The broker-
dealers cannot state the equities underlying their position with 
respect to both the University's complaint and the third party actions 
more succinctly than this Court has itself explained ~emt.l!./ 
In determining legal rights on the basis of fair-
ness and justice, the idea of sovereign immunity 
is perplexing. It has the effect of clothing one 
party to the controversy with an advantage which 
is in most instances unfair and unwarranted. 
234. Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Bd., 105 Utah 417, 
425-26, 142 P.2d 657, 660 61 (1943). The court in that case 
estopped the Board from reducing pension payments to a retired 
school teacher under a new statute which would no longer authorize 
those paym7nts. Instead, the court ruled, the State must continue 
t~ pay a higher amount than that allowed by statute to the plain-
t7ff, even though such payments would be ultra vires and prospec-
tive (ra~her than purely retrospective, as is the case with the 
amounts involved herein). 
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The State is merely a collection of individuals, and 
there seems to be no logical reason why the collec-
tive entity should not be bound by the same concepts 
of justice and morality as its individual members, at 
least with respect to contractual obligations. 
Accordingly, the broker-dealers respectfully request the 
following relief from this Court: 
1. Reversal of the partial summary judgment orders entered 
in favor of the University, with directions to the trial court to 
reverse its rulings denying the broker-dealers' second motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim and to enter judgment in favor 
of all broker-dealers on those motions to dismiss. 
2. Reversal of the final judgments entered in favor of the 
third-party defendants and the University on the third-party complaints 
and counterclaims. This relief should be granted regardless of how 
the Court rules on the partial summary judgment question. 
3. If the Court does not grant the broker-dealers the 
relief requested in paragraph 1 above, then they respectfully request 
that it reverse the trial court's rulings on personal jurisdiction and 
venue. If it does so, then the complaints against Sutro, Bear Stearns 
and Hornblower should be dismissed for lack of in personam jurisdiction 
and the Merrill Lynch action should be transferred to the Third 
District Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of June, 1979. 
§J.jk 
~~ ~lene w. Lowe 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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APPENDIX A 
BUSINESS SOPHISTICATION OF UNIVERSITY OFFICERS 
AND INSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS 
A brief description of the business experience and sophisticatioo 
of Institutional Council members and University officers demonstrates 
that considerable business acumen was brought to the investment progrM 
1) Councilman Plowman was, during the period in question, 
President and Chairman of the Board of Lewiston State Bank in Cache 
County. He handled the municipal and governmental bond portfolio for 
the bank. For liquidity reasons, he invested in high grade municipals 
and government issues.~/ As an Institutional Council member, he was 
a charter member of the University's investment committee and as such 
he attended the Ford Foundation seminar in San Francisco in January 
1971.y 
2) Councilman Bullen received his MBA from Harvard Univer· 
sity, is a successful businessman, and has purchased securities, 
3/ including common stocks for his own account, for the past 25 years.-
He also attended the Ford Foundation seminar in January 1971 and was a 
charter member of the investment committee.±/ 
3) Councilman Hammond was Senior Vice President for First 
Security Bank from 1950 to 1970 and in that capacity was in charge of 
1. Plowman depo. at 7-9. 
2. Exs. 10, 197. 
3. Bullen depo. at 7-8. 
4. Exs. 10, 17. 
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its Northern Division, which includes all its banks from Davis County 
to Idaho. He was familiar with the bank's trust department and the 
securities purchased by that department, as well as the standards and 
policies set by the bank regarding such purchases. One such policy 
was diversification, to spread the risk of loss. Whether to purchase 
a conservative or speculative security was given great consideration 
by the bank. He has also purchased securities for his own account. 
When he graduated from college in 1924, he was employed as a salesman 
with a brokerage firm, selling stocks and bonds. He understands the 
traditional considerations used to determine the quality of a security.~ 
4) Councilman Harris was on the Board of Directors of 
First Security Bank, is a "good" and "successful" businessman and, in 
connection with his business, has large borrowings from the three 
largest banks in Western America.0' He also served as chairman of 
the investment committee as early as April 1972.2/ 
5) Councilman Stockdale is a certified public account-
ant. From the early 1960's to the present, he has supervised the 
investment of endowment funds of Brigham Young University in common 
stocks and bonds. In addition, from 1969 to 1971 he gave advice to 
clerks in his office in regard to handling common stocks on a regular 
basis. He has also performed this service for a number of his accounts. 
He served on the Business Affairs and the Investment Committees of the 
University . .§./ 
5. Hammond depo. at 7-13. 
6. Harris depo. at 31. 
7. Ex. 49. 
8. Stockdale depo. at 7-17. 
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6) Councilman Olsen is a successful rancher who has been 
purchasing stocks in his own account for some 20 years and who under-
f . 9/ stands the nature o a margin account.-
7) Councilman Bingham is a civil engineer who invested in 
securities in his own account sufficiently to understand what a margin 
account was.lO/ 
9. Olsen depo. at 10. 
10. Bingham depo~ at 9. 
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API-ENDIX "B" 
CORPORATE RESOLUTION: 
l, ______ L_. _M_ar_k_N_e_u_hc_r..,.g.._f'_r ________ , being duly constituted 
St•rreta ry to the ___ ln_s_h_·tu_ti_o_n_:i_l _C_,,_111_n...;.c_il'-'1'--"U-'-t:i"-h.;...;.S;..;.t."l;.;.l;_t'--'-l1.;.:n..:..iv'-'t'-''r;..;.s;..;.i.:.ty'---------
a corporation organized and existing under and by the virtue of the laws of the State 
of Utah (hereinafter called this Corporation) do hereby certify that the following is 
a true and complete copy of resolutions duly adopted at a meeting of the Board of 
Directors of this Corporation, duly called and held on __ J_a_nu_a_rv _ 2_0~, _1_9_7_2 ___ _ 
at which a quorum was present and voting; that said resolutions are still in full force 
and effect and have not been rescinded; and that said resolutions are not in conflict 
with the Charter or By-Laws of this Corporation. 
BE IT RESOLVED: That this corporation is authorized and empowered to open 
and maintain an account with any broker who is a member of any of the major security 
exchanges or the National Association of Security Dealers for the purchase, trade, 
and sale, long or short, transfer, and assign, stocks, bonds, and securities of every 
nature on margin or otherwise, and that any of the officers hereinafter named be, and 
hereby is authorized to give written or verbli.l instruction to the brokers concerning 
the herein named transactions; and he shall at all times have authority in every way to 
bind and obligate this corporation for the carrying out of any contract or transaction 
which shall, for or on behalf of this corporation, be entered into or made with or 
through the brokers; and that the brokers are authorized to receive from this corpor-
ation, checks and drafts drawn upon the funds of this corporation by any officer or em-
ployee of this corporation, and to apply the same to the credit of this corporation or to 
its account with said brokers: All confirmations, notices, and demands upon this cor-
poration may be delivered by the brokers verbally or in writing, or by telegraph, or by 
telephone to any such officer and he is authorized to empower any person, or persons, 
that he deems proper, at any time, or times, to do any and all things that he is herein-
before authorized to do. That this resolution shall be and remain in full force and effect 
until written notice of the revocation hereof shall be delivered to the brokers. The 
officer(s) herein referred to and named as follows, to-wit: 
(1) Dee A. Broadbent, Vice President of Business and Treasurer 
(2) Donald A. Catron Controller 
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Corporate Resolution: Page IT 
I, ______ ....:L::..:.... -'M-"'""ar"'"k--"N""e'"'u""bc"'""'r..,.g._e_r __________ , Secretary of 
Utah State University Institutional Council 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of a resolution duly 
and regularly passed and adopted by the unanimous vote of the Board of Directors of 
said company at a meeting thereof duly called and held at the office of said company 
on the ___ 2_o_th ___ day of _____ J_a_n_u_a....:ry'---------• 19-23_, at which meet-
ing the directors were present and voting, that said resolution appears in the minutes 
of said meeting, and that the same has not been rescinded or modified and is now in 
full force and effect. 
I further certify that said corporation is duly organized and existing, and has 
the power to take the action called for by the foregoing resolution. 
SEAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appel-
lant was mailed this Ll 'f{ day of I 1979 to each 
of the following: r 
Darwin C. Hansen, 110 West Center Street, Bountiful, 
Utah 84010, attorney for third-party defendant Donald 
Catron; 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Michael Heyrund, of Watkiss 
& Campbell, 310 South Main Street, 12th Floor, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, attorneys for Phillip A. Bullen, Jay R. 
Bingham, O. C. Hammond, Jay Dee Harris, Beverly D. Kurnpfer, 
Snell Olsen, Rex G. Plowman, W. B. Robins, Alva C. Snow, 
William R. Stockdale, Jane S. Tibbals, Glen L. Taggart, 
Dee A. Broadbent, L. Mark Neuberger, defendants and third-
party plaintiffs; 
David L. Wilkinson, Co. Attorney's Office, Room C-220, 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
attorney for Utah State University of Agriculture and 
Applied Science; 
Lyle W. Hillyard, 175 East 100 North, Logan, Utah 84321; 
David R. Melton, Esq., of 
5720 Sears Tower, 233 So. 
60606. 
Karon, Morrison & Savikas, Ltd., 
Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 
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